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PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 




The COVID-19 pandemic has caused millions of deaths and disastrous consequences 
around the world, with lasting repercussions for every field of law, including privacy and 
technology. The unique characteristics of this pandemic have precipitated an increase in use of 
new technologies, including remote communications platforms, healthcare robots, and medical 
AI. Public and private actors are using new technologies, like heat sensing, and technologically-
influenced programs, like contact tracing, alike in response, leading to a rise in government and 
corporate surveillance in sectors like healthcare, employment, education, and commerce. 
Advocates have raised the alarm for privacy and civil liberties violations, but the emergency 
nature of the pandemic has drowned out many concerns.  
This Article is the first comprehensive account of privacy impacts related to technology 
and public health responses to the COVID-19 crisis. Many have written on the general need 
for better health privacy protections, education privacy protections, consumer privacy protections, 
and protections against government and corporate surveillance. However, this Article is the first 
comprehensive article to examine these problems of privacy and technology specifically in light 
of the pandemic, arguing that the lens of the pandemic exposes the need for both widescale and 
small-scale reform of privacy law. This Article approaches these problems with a focus on 
technical realities and social salience, and with a critical awareness of digital and political 
inequities, crafting normative recommendations with these concepts in mind. 
Understanding privacy in this time of pandemic is critical for law and policymaking 
in the near future and for the long-term goals of creating a future society that protects both civil 
liberties and public health. It is also important to create a contemporary scholarly understanding 
of privacy in pandemic at this moment in time, as a matter of historical record. By examining 
privacy in pandemic, in the midst of pandemic, this Article seeks to create a holistic scholarly 




* Clinical Assistant Visiting Professor, Boston University School of Law; Fellow, Yale 
Law School Information Society Project. The author thanks Tally Amir, Chinmayi Arun, Jack 
M. Balkin, Lindsey Barrett, Danielle Keats Citron, James Grimmelmann, Woodrow Hartzog, 
Stephanie Hsia, Bonnie Kaplan, Michael Karanicolas, Jisu Kim, Bonnie Kaplan, Asaf Lubin, 
Michael Meuer, Przemyslaw Palka, Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Andrew Sellars, David Seipp, Kate 
Silbaugh, Christina Spiesel, Rory Van Loo, Patricia Vargas, David Thaw, Laurin Weissinger, 
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Kathy Zeiler, and the participants of the Yale Information Society 
Project fellows workshop, the Boston University School of Law faculty workshop, and the 
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, for their helpful feedback and guidance, as well as 
Sasha Dudding for excellent research assistance. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690004
 PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 3 
I. PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC ...................................................... 7 
A. COVID-19 TESTING ............................................................................................. 8 
1. Taxonomy of COVID-19 Tests ...................................................................... 9 
2. Taxonomy of Testing Actors ......................................................................... 12 
3. Taxonomy of COVID Data ........................................................................ 14 
4. Understanding the COVID-19 Testing Data Lifecycle ...................................... 17 
5. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Testing Data Privacy ....................... 19 
B. IMMUNITY PASSPORTS AND VERIFICATION MECHANISMS .................................... 25 
C. CONTACT TRACING ............................................................................................. 31 
1. Contact Tracing Principles ............................................................................ 31 
2. Human Contact Tracing .............................................................................. 32 
3. Digital Contact Tracing ................................................................................ 36 
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions for Contact-Tracing Programs ......................... 42 
D. NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES IN HEALTHCARE ........................................................... 43 
1. Telehealth and Telemedicine .......................................................................... 43 
2. Medical AI for Research, Diagnostics, and Triage ............................................. 45 
3. Healthcare Robots ....................................................................................... 49 
II. TECH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC ......................................................................... 53 
A. GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE ............................................................................ 54 
B. EMPLOYER SURVEILLANCE .................................................................................. 57 
1. Remote Work Surveillance ............................................................................ 57 
2. In-Person Corporate Surveillance .................................................................... 60 
3. Digital Inequities ........................................................................................ 61 
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Employee Privacy ............................ 64 
C. EDUCATION PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC ................................................................... 65 
1. Education Technology .................................................................................. 66 
2. In-Person Campus Surveillance ...................................................................... 68 
3. Digital Inequities ........................................................................................ 69 
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Education Privacy ........................... 73 
D. CONSUMER-CONNECTION TECHNOLOGIES ........................................................ 77 
1. Remote-Connection Technologies ..................................................................... 77 
2. In-Person Consumer Surveillance .................................................................... 79 
3. Digital Inequities ........................................................................................ 80 
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Consumer Privacy ........................... 81 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 82 
A. CHANGING PRIVACY NORMS ............................................................................... 82 
1. Blurring the Line Between Cyber and Physical Space ............................. 82 
2. Privacy Is Essential for Public Health ...................................................... 83 
B. LAW AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 84 
1. Sectoral Privacy Protection Is Not Enough ....................................................... 84 
2. Health, Biometric, and Genetic Privacy Laws Are Insufficient .............................. 85 
3. Privacy Law Must Address Digital Inequities .................................................. 86 
4. Privacy Law Should Protect a Right to Educational Privacy ................................ 87 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690004
 PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC 3 
5. Privacy-Forward Platform Regulation .............................................................. 87 
6. Regulating Data Aggregators and Downstream Data Harms ............................... 88 




Alison Schwartz, 29 years old, a People Magazine staffer in New York City. 
 
Adolph “T.J.” Mendez, 44 years old, a father of six in New Braunfels, Texas. 
 
Nashom Wooden, 50 years old, a drag queen in New York City. 
 
Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy, 87 years old, a federal judge for the Southern 
District of New York. 
 
Sarah Herbert, 5 years old, the daughter of two essential workers in Detroit, 
Michigan. 
 
These1 are just five of the hundreds of thousands of people2 who have died 
of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Millions more have been infected and 
recovered,3 some with lasting health ramifications and some, particularly in 
countries like the United States, with staggering hospital bills.4 The pandemic 
has caused untold damage to people all around the world and has spurred small 
to drastic shifts in the use of technology across sectors. This Article explores the 
privacy aspect of new technologies and new technologically influenced 
initiatives deployed as part of the COVID-19 response by both public and 
private actors. 
 
COVID-19, also known as the “novel coronavirus,” or SARS-CoV-2, is a 
highly contagious virus that causes a range of symptoms in humans, often 
 
1 From Buzzfeed’s moving collection of profiles, at The Victims of COVID-19, BUZZFEED 
(Apr. 2, 2020, 12:38 PM ET), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/buzzfeednews/the-
victims-of-covid-19. 
2 See Coronavirus Tracked: The Latest Figures as Countries Fight to Contain the Pandemic, FIN. 
TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/a26fbf7e-48f8-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441 (last accessed 
May 21, 2020). 
3 More than 13.4 million as of July 16, 2020. See Coronavirus Tracked: The Latest Figures as 
Countries Fight to Contain the Pandemic, FIN. TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/a26fbf7e-48f8-
11ea-aeb3-955839e06441 (last accessed July 16, 2020). 
4 Abigail Abrams, America’s Health System Will Likely Make the Coronavirus Outbreak Worse, 
TIME (Mar. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5794672/health-insurance-deductibles-coronavirus; 
Abigail Abrams, Total Cost of Her COVID-19 Treatment: $34,927.43, TIME (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://time.com/5806312/coronavirus-treatment-cost. 
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primarily attacking the respiratory system.5 There are a few unique characteristics 
of COVID-19 that are important to note when examining the use of technology 
in the public health, government, and corporate response to the virus. First, the 
virus is fast-moving, with global reach. Though the outbreak was first declared 
a Public Health Emergency by the World Health Organization on January 30, 
2020,6 the virus quickly reached most parts of the world in a manner of months. 
Second, the virus is deadly. As of May 2020, the virus has killed almost 300,000 
worldwide,7 including 105,000 in the United States alone, as of June 3.8 Third, 
the virus is highly contagious. Early research suggests it may spread through tiny 
virus particles released from infected individuals, potentially transmitting 
through coughs, sneezes, talking, breathing9, or potentially even through the 
air.10 Fourth, the virus can be invisible. Individuals infected with the virus may 
take up to two weeks to develop symptoms, and many may be completely 
asymptomatic.  
 
These four factors (fast-moving spread, contagiousness, deadliness, and 
potential for invisible, asymptomatic transmission) have led to severe measures 
to help stem or stop viral transmission. Social distancing11 has become the rule 
for many regions, including entire nations. The concept behind social distancing 
is that the virus will spread more slowly if humans do not get close enough to 
each other to be in range of virus particles released from breath,12 touch, and so 
on. To support social distancing, governments have shut down schools, 
businesses, retail, restaurants, and more. The shutdowns have contributed to 
 
5 Neel V. Patel, How Does the Coronavirus Work?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/04/15/999476/explainer-how-does-the-
coronavirus-work. 
6 Rolling Updates on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen 
(last updated May 19, 2020). 
7 FIN. TIMES, supra note 3. 
8 Joe Fox et al., At Least 92,000 People Have Died From Coronavirus in the U.S., WASH. POST 
(June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/coronavirus-us-
cases-deaths/. 
9 How COVID-19 Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html. 
10 Lisa Lockerd Maragakis, Coronavirus Disease 2019 vs. the Flu, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirus-
disease-2019-vs-the-flu. 
11 Josiah Bates, What Is ‘Social Distancing?’ Here’s How to Best Practice It as Coronavirus Spreads, 
TIME (Mar. 11, 2020), https://time.com/5800442/social-distancing-coronavirus./ 
12 David Williams, How Coronavirus Spread from One Member to 87% of the Singers at a 
Washington Choir Practice, CNN (May 13, 2020), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/13/us/coronavirus-washington-choir-outbreak-
trnd/index.html; Loud Talking Could Leave Coronavirus in the Air for Up to 14 Minutes, MIT TECH. 
REV. (May 13, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/13/1001696/loud-
talking-could-leave-coronavirus-in-the-air-for-up-to-14-minutes. 
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mass unemployment.13 (Over 11 million Americans lost their jobs in March 2020 
alone.14) The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as well 
as many states, have also encouraged people to wear masks at all times when 
outside or near the presence of others.15 As of May 2020, scientists expect a 
vaccine may not be ready until 2021.16 
 
States have attempted to respond to the crisis by using technological 
solutions to try to stop or slow the spread of the novel coronavirus. Many of 
these solutions have been data-driven, with few if any guarantees for individual 
data privacy. These technology-influenced solutions include Bluetooth tracking, 
cell-phone location data tracking, various types of testing (including antigen and 
antibody testing), immunity passports or certification, human and digital contact 
tracing, and more. Public health responses have included increased use of 
telemedicine and telehealth (often through remote communication 
technologies), as well as use of medical AI and healthcare robots. Governments 
have used surveillance technologies, like facial recognition and remote heat 
sensing, as part of response efforts as well. As always, with new government 
surveillance comes new risks and dangers to civil liberties and privacy, 
particularly for marginalized populations.17 
 
Corporations, too, have developed and implemented new technological 
programs in response to this pandemic. Consumer technologies, including 
remote communication technologies, have risen to the forefront. These 
technologies have also been used in the work setting, as many white-collar 
workers have moved to remote offices. All of these programs come with their 
own risks to security and privacy. Corporate surveillance also extends to the 
physical realm, as companies have instituted privacy-invasive measures like 
temperature checks for employees.  
 
 
13 Sylvan Lane, More Than 11 Million Laid Off in March as Coronavirus Spread Through US, 
HILL (May 15, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/498005-more-than-11-million-laid-
off-in-march-as-coronavirus-spread-through-us. 
14 Id. 
15 Recommendation Regarding the Use of Cloth Face Coverings, Especially in Areas of Significant 
Community-Based Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-cover.html. 
16 Quentin Fotrell, ‘The 1918 Spanish Flu’s Second Wave Was Even More Devastating’: 
Americans Brace for Another Coronavirus Outbreak in the Fall, MARKETWATCH (May 21, 2020), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/we-will-not-have-a-vaccine-by-next-winter-what-
happens-when-coronavirus-returns-2020-04-22. 
17 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Mary A. Franks, 
Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 441 (2017); Scott Skinner-Thompson, 
Performative Privacy, 50 DAVIS L. REV.1673 (2017); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double 
Standards, 93 WASH. REV 2051 (2018) [hereinafter Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double 
Standards]) 
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Outside of government public health response and corporate employee 
surveillance, individuals have seen changes in the use of technologies and 
privacy protections in other sectors as well. Many corporate surveillance 
technologies are also being used in the education sector, putting the privacy of 
students and educators at risk. At the same time, the social distancing measures 
necessary for life in a pandemic have led to an increase in the use of remote 
communication technologies in private life, changing the way individuals 
experience technology in the workplace, in education, and in social lives. 
 
This Article examines privacy aspects of new technologies and 
technologically-influenced public health responses that have risen to the 
forefront as a result of the pandemic. Understanding privacy in this time of 
pandemic is critical, both for our near future and for the long-term goals of 
creating a future society that protects both civil liberties and public health. 
Certainly, with the benefit of hindsight, future scholars will likely find that many 
of the technological solutions proposed and implemented now were actually 
unhelpful or perhaps even harmful. However, examining how privacy was 
considered and understood during the pandemic will aid future scholarship and 
support the efforts of others tasked with shaping laws that deal with privacy in 
future global crises, in addition to adding to the longitudinal study of our 
society’s ever-changing relationship with data and technology over time. 
 
The Article first looks at public-health programs that have developed as part 
of pandemic response. These programs include COVID-19 testing programs, 
contact tracing programs, immunity passports, and novel uses of technology in 
medicine and healthcare, including medical AI and healthcare robots. Next, the 
Article explores the privacy impacts of new technologies through a variety of 
sectors: government surveillance; employee surveillance; educational privacy; 
and consumer privacy. Finally, the Article offers normative recommendations 
for protecting privacy while also supporting public health. 
 
While a growing body of scholarship is rapidly developing on legal issues 
related to the COVID-19 pandemic18, this Article provides the first 
comprehensive analysis of privacy, technology, and public health responses 
across sectors. Furthermore, this Article is unique in explaining the technical 
and scientific components of each of these privacy-affective technological 
solutions, as well as focusing on the societal changes that have pushed the use 
of these technologies and have come about as a result of these technological 
changes. Most of the technologies being deployed as COVID-19 responses are 
not new. As Jack M. Balkin has opined, the novelty of new technologies is not 
 
18 See, e.g., this in-progress special issue of the Journal of Law and Biosciences: 
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/09/pandemic-issue-journal-of-law-and-the-
biosciences/ 
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what matters for understanding how the law should regulate. Rather, it is what 
has changed in society that has driven the rise in certain technologies that we 
should seek to understand. In creating new laws for new technologies (or new 
crises), we should look to salience, not novelty.19  
 
Finally, this article is unique in shedding light on critical dimensions of 
privacy in times of pandemic, particularly impacts on marginalized groups, 
including intersectional analysis of disparate harms, reflecting on Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s groundbreaking work on understanding the intersection of race, 
gender, and other identities in law, politics, and theory.20 Understanding the 
impact race, gender, and other dimensions have on public health, privacy, and 
technology are critical, as the pandemic has highlighted inequalities throughout 
society.  
 
Much further study is needed on this subject, including empirical work on 
privacy practices and responses, as well as research on disparate impact, and 
comparative research on the vastly different privacy-related programs that 
nations and regions have developed—influenced in no small part, to be sure, by 
their unique legal and regulatory regimes. This Article focuses primarily on U.S. 
privacy law, as well as privacy-related developments in the United States. The 
Article does not claim to provide an exhaustive study of all potential privacy 
implications of all pandemic-related interventions, but rather serves to lay the 
groundwork for future scholarship on these issues. 
 
I. PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC 
 
There exists a long literature in bioethics and health law on concepts of 
privacy and individual rights in healthcare, from the concept of informed 
consent (far beyond the norms of notice and consent in privacy theory)21 to 
questions of ethics in medical research and medical practice. Under the 
American sector-specific privacy law regime,22 a smattering of laws governs 
 
19 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (2004).) 
20 KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139. 
21 Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1505 (2018). 
22 Unlike in some other nations, the United States lacks omnibus privacy regulation. 
Instead, privacy law is governed by an amalgamation of different laws and regulations for 
specific sectors, including particular types of data, particular types of data subjects, and 
particular industries. Constitutional privacy rights also come not from a clear constitutional 
provision, unlike in other nations, but from a “penumbra” of privacy rights. See Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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health privacy and health technology, including HIPAA23 (and the Privacy Rule 
and HITECH24), GINA,25 FTC consumer protection law,26 and state privacy 
laws. Additionally, scholars like Khiara Bridges have explored privacy in 
healthcare and the degrees to which different people are afforded different 
privacy protections based on race, income, gender, and more.27  
 
This section examines public-health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
namely: testing, immunity passports, telehealth, medical AI, and healthcare 
robots. While many of the technologies used for public-health pandemic 
response are not new,28 the specific pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic create 
a unique lens through which to examine the use of technology for public health 
response. 
 
A.  COVID-19 Testing 
 
Since the beginning of the pandemic, states have raced to increase their 
testing capabilities, in the hopes of stopping or slowing the spread of the virus.29 
Testing of any kind generates data, some of it potentially identifiable. Different 
public and private testing bodies have tackled testing—including public health 
agencies, private clinics, employers, and education institutions. Some have 
argued that there may be a moral duty for individuals to donate data for public 
health purposes in this time.30 The rapidly increased scale of testing around the 
world creates an increase in potential harms related to data collection, use, and 
transfer. To understand the privacy dimensions of viral testing, it is first 
necessary to establish a baseline understanding of the tests and the parties 
involved in testing, before turning to privacy implications. 
 
 
23 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 136. 
24 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). 
25 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881. 
26 CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 
(2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). 
27 KHIARA BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2019). 
28 Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 NEV. NEV.L.J. 
722, 723-24 (2013). 
29 Umair Irfan, The Case for Ending the Covid-19 Pandemic with Mass Testing, VOX (Apr. 13, 
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/13/21215133/coronavirus-testing-covid-19-tests-
screening. 
30 Brent Mittelstadt et al., Is There a Duty to Participate in Digital Epidemiology?, LIFE SCI., 
SOC’Y & POL’Y (May 9, 2018), 
https://lsspjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40504-018-0074-1. 
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1. Taxonomy of COVID-19 Tests 
 
There are three types of COVID-19 testing that have come to the forefront 
in pandemic response: polymerase chain reaction tests (PCR), antigen testing, 
and antibody tests.31 Each of these forms of testing produce biological 
samples—primarily mucus or blood. 
 
PCR tests are the most common and accurate tests for determining if a 
person has an active COVID-19 infection.32 These tests are performed by a 
healthcare provider using a long thin swab to collect a mucus sample from an 
individual’s throat or nose.33 The sample is then sent to a lab (external or in-
house, if the clinic or hospital has facilities) to determine if the sample contains 
COVID-19 genetic material—a process that may take a number of days to yield 
results.34  The transport between testing location and lab may take up to twenty-
four hours, and the test itself may take six hours to complete (though processing 
time varies by lab).35 
 
Antigen tests (or rapid diagnostic tests) detect the presence of antigens (viral 
proteins) of the COVID-19 virus. These tests are significantly faster than PCR 
tests, producing results in approximately fifteen minutes, according to the 
CDC36 (thirty minutes according to the WHO37), and are relatively simple to 
perform.38 Dr. Deborah Birx, the White House coronavirus response 
 
31 Overview of Testing for SARS-CoV-2, Center for Disease Control (July 17, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/testing-overview.html, (last accessed July 
24, 2020); Coronavirus Testing Basics, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last accessed 
July 24, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/coronavirus-testing-
basics ; (Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus 
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-
antigen-antibody/index.html. 
32 Id. 
33 A. Pawlowski, Coronavirus Test: What Is it Like to Get the Nasal Swab for Detecting COVID-
19?, TODAY (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.today.com/health/coronavirus-test-what-it-get-
nasal-swab-detecting-covid-19-t176271. 
34 Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus 
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-antigen-
antibody/index.html 
35 Julie Appleby, Why It Takes So Long To Get Most COVID-19 Test Results, NPR (Mar. 28, 
2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/03/28/822869504/why-it-takes-so-
long-to-get-most-covid-19-test-results. 
36 Rapid Influenza Diagnostic Tests, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/clinician_guidance_ridt.htm. 
37 Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/advice-on-the-
use-of-point-of-care-immunodiagnostic-tests-for-covid-19. 
38 Rapid Influenza Diagnostic Tests, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
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coordinator, said in April that antigen tests may be the “breakthrough” needed 
to test large numbers of people in the United States, given that antigen tests are 
simpler and faster than PCR tests.39 However, accurate antigen tests can be 
difficult to produce and may be more likely to miss active infection; indeed, the 
World Health Organization has cautioned against their use in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic due to the lack of accuracy and limited data available, as 
of April 2020.40 
 
Antibody tests (or serological tests) “measure the amount of antibodies or 
proteins present in the blood when the body is responding to a specific 
infection, like COVID-19.”41 Antibody tests can determine whether a person 
has previously been exposed to a particular pathogen,42 by detecting whether the 
person has developed antibodies in their immune system that would suggest a 
prior immune response to the novel coronavirus in the body.43 (However, 
antibody tests cannot differentiate between patients with active and past 
infections.44) Antibody tests can be performed by collecting blood samples from 
individuals. In April 2020, Germany began conducting Europe’s first nationwide 
COVID-19 antibody testing program.45 The U.S. National Institutes of Health 




39 Arman Arzad, Antigen Tests: The Coronavirus ‘Breakthrough’ That a Top White House Official 
Says We Need, CNN (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/27/health/antigen-
tests-coronavirus-breakthrough/index.html. 
40 Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/advice-on-the-
use-of-point-of-care-immunodiagnostic-tests-for-covid-19. 
41 Press Release, Stephen M. Hahn, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Food & Drug Admin., 





43 Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus 
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-
antigen-antibody/index.html. 
44 Gagan Mathur and Sweta Matur, Antibody Testing for Covid-19: Can It Be Used As a Screening 
Tool in Areas with Low Prevalence?, 154 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1 (May 
15, 2020). 




46 Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to Go Back to School 
or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), 
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At this time, it is still uncertain how strong immunity might be or how long 
it might last.47 There have been cases of people testing positive twice (likely due 
to having higher levels of antibodies when first tested and lower level of 
antibodies when tested later), seemingly not developing immunity to the virus.48 
Antibody tests may also have a problem with accuracy,49 especially because the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has issued a policy allowing developers 
of some serological tests to bring to market their tests without prior FDA 
review.50 In April 2020, the WHO recommended against the use of antibody 
tests as diagnostics for patient care, but encouraged their use for “disease 
surveillance and epidemiological research.”51 
 
Some have suggested the use of antibody tests to “re-open” society52 as the 
 
47 Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus 
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-antigen-
antibody/index.html; Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to 
Go Back to School or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),; 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html. 
48John Bacon, Can you get infected with COVID-19 twice? Experts say possibility is 
'certainly real', USA TODAY (July 16, 2020, 3:17 PM ET), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/07/16/covid-19-can-you-get-infected-
twice-herd-immunity/5429012002/ 
49 Gagan Mathur and Sweta Matur, Antibody Testing for Covid-19: Can It Be Used As a 
Screening Tool in Areas with Low Prevalence?, 154 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 
1 (May 15, 2020);  Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to Go 
Back to School or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html. 
50 Press Release, Stephen M. Hahn, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Food & Drug Admin., 
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: Serological Tests, https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-serological-tests. 
51 Advice on the Use of Point-of-Care Immunodiagnostic Tests for COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/advice-on-the-
use-of-point-of-care-immunodiagnostic-tests-for-covid-19. 
52 See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Bryce Nesbitt, The ‘Certified Recovered’ from Covid-19 Could Lead the 
Economic Recovery, STAT (Apr. 6. 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/06/the-certified-
recovered-from-covid-19-could-lead-the-economic-recovery; Opinion, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, We 
Can Safely Restart the Economy in June. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html; Veronika 
Hackenbroch, Große Antikörperstudie Soll Immunität Der Deutschen Gegen Covid-19 Feststellen, DER 
SPIEGEL (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosse-
antikoerper-studie-soll-immunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd73-
48c17c1bad23; Jason Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right 
Antibodies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-coronavirus-antibodies.html; 
Carolyn Y. Johnson, Testing Coronavirus Survivors’ Blood Could Help Reopen U.S., WASH. POST 
(Mar. 31, 2020, 12:35 PM EDT), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/31/coronavirus-serology-blood-tests. 
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pandemic slows. These tests could be used to determine or prove immunity to 
the virus, a form of validation that could then be used for “immunity passports” 
that could allow individuals to do certain types of work, travel, or do other 
higher risk activities.53 These immunity passports (and related proposals) come 
with a host of privacy, algorithmic accountability, and digital inequity issues,54 as 
discussed later in this paper. However, it is uncertain if antibody tests can be 
used as an effective screening tool to allow re-opening of schools or businesses 
in areas with high prevalence of COVID-1955, regardless of how immunity 
passport proposals develop. 
 
2. Taxonomy of Testing Actors 
 
When discussing privacy, it is always critical to determine which actors are 
involved in collecting, using, sharing, and storing data. As the pandemic 
progresses, a number of agents have become involved in testing. The public-
private divide may be a less useful distinction here, as many testing programs 
have developed as public-private partnerships (which itself raises a number of 
issues in terms of regulatory oversight). For example, the controversial data 
analytics company Palantir Technologies partnered with the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Center for Disease Control, with the 
technology company offering “data tools … to ‘clean’ and ‘harmonize’ the 
information flowing in from local hospitals, states and other sources related to 
the virus.”56 
 
Some nations have implemented national testing campaigns for public 









53 Lydia Smith, Germany to Introduce Coronavirus ‘Immunity Certificates’ for Recovered Public, 
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodies-tests-general-
public-immunity-certificates-1494934. 
54 Henry T. Greely, Covid-19 ‘Immunity Certificates’: Practical and Ethical Conundrums, STAT 
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/10/immunity-certificates-covid-19-
practical-ethical-conundrums. 
55 Gagan Mathur and Sweta Matur, Antibody Testing for Covid-19: Can It Be Used As a Screening 
Tool in Areas with Low Prevalence?, 154 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1 (May 
15, 2020);   
56 Jackson Barnett, Inside Palantir’s work with the CDC, HHS to synthesize COVID-19 data, 
FEDSCOOP (April 2, 2020), https://www.fedscoop.com/palantir-covid-19-coronavirus-data-
cdc-hhs/. 
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nationwide COVID-19 antibody testing program.57  The U.S. NIH also 
embarked on a much more limited program to test 10,000 U.S. volunteers for 
antibodies.58 Across the United States, states, counties, and cities have developed 
testing campaigns, some as public programs and some as public-private 
partnerships.59  
 
In the absence of, or perhaps in addition to, federally-driven nationwide 
testing in the U.S., this mishmash network of testing programs has created a 
fairly large cast of characters—parties that could be considered data controllers 
or processors60 for data generated from COVID-19 related testing. (While the 
U.S. does not generally use the data controller vs. processor framework61 for 
privacy regulation, it can be a useful metric for understanding the roles of 
different actors in the data lifecycle of COVID-19 testing.) 
 
The parties involved at the primary point of collection include private 
companies (particularly in technology and healthcare industries), universities and 
research centers, hospitals and healthcare providers, governments, and—in the 
case of distributed or open data projects—potentially the public. Many of these 
would fulfill a data controller-like role. U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
privacy regulation would also apply to many testing actors collecting data or 
performing testing.62 
 
Third parties that may obtain or have interest in COVID-19 testing data 
include relevant health and technology companies and organizations, as well as 
(potentially) downstream commercial actors, including data brokers and 
unrelated companies that may wish to use the data for other purposes (e.g., 
 




58 Apoorva Mandavilli & Katie Thomas, Will an Antibody Test Allow Us to Go Back to School 
or Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/health/coronavirus-antibody-test.html. 
59 See, e.g., https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/30/hhs-extends-covid-19-testing-
public-private-partnership.html 
60 In E.U. data protection law, most notably in the General Data Protection Regulation, a 
data controller “determines the purposes for which and the means by which personal data is 
processed,” while a data processor processes the data on behalf of a controller. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-
organisations/obligations/controller-processor/what-data-controller-or-data-processor_en 
61 Jones, Meg and Kaminski, Margot E., An American's Guide to the GDPR (June 5, 
2020). Denver Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2020. 
62 For example, private companies conducting testing would likely fall under FTC 
jurisdiction regarding unfair and misleading practices involved with testing and promises made 
to consumers. 
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marketing health products). Additionally, government actors may have or may 
obtain access to COVID-19 testing data—both for direct COVID-19 response 
purposes as well as potentially other purposes, including government 
surveillance and law enforcement. Finally, no system is ever fully secure, so with 
any collection of COVID-19 testing data, there will always be the threat of bad 
actors accessing or obtaining data. These bad actors could potentially include 
foreign state actors, leading to national security concerns. 
 
It is useful to understand which actors are involved throughout the data 
lifecycle of data obtained from or generated by COVID-19 testing, particularly 
for regulators and policymakers who wish to govern these practices and actors, 
as well as for individuals to later seek legal or other recourse. 
 
3. Taxonomy of COVID Data 
 
There are many types of data relevant to a privacy analysis of the COVID-
19 testing process. It is beyond the scope of this paper (and not useful, perhaps) 
to attempt to define every type of data in every possible taxonomy. However, 
here are a few important categories of data to consider when thinking about 
privacy and COVID-19 testing. 
 
COVID-19 testing, be it polymerase chain reaction tests (PCR), antigen 
testing, or antibody tests,63 involves collecting biological samples—primarily 
mucus or blood. These samples are then analyzed to determine if a person has 
been exposed to the virus or has a current viral infection. Different forms of 
data are generated by COVID-19 testing. These include the biological samples 
or specimens, of course, but also more data collected and generated throughout 
the process.  
 
Consider, for example, the health data connected to the patient that is 
collected when individuals enter the primary point of collection (e.g., testing 
center, hospital, research center). If a patient signs in at the front desk of a 
hospital, that is data that could potentially be linked to data generated by the 
person’s testing process. Data collectors (e.g., hospitals and researchers) may ask 
additional questions (e.g., asking for symptoms) during the testing process, and 
individuals may offer additional data (e.g., demographic data). Other biological 
samples may also be taken, for analysis of other factors that are not directly 
related to COVID-19 viral presence. The analysis phase (where biological 
samples are analyzed by labs) can produce more data, including but not limited 
 
63 Eric Levenson & Arman Azad, What to Know About the Three Main Types of Coronavirus 
Tests, CNN (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-testing-pcr-antigen-
antibody/index.html. 
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to data determining COVID-19 exposure.  
 
A non-exhaustive list of types of data that may be generated throughout the 
COVID-19 testing lifecycle include: 
• Biological samples (including samples used for COVID-19 detection as 
well as other samples) 
• Genetic data (obtained from biological samples or from other 
sources)64 
• Health data (obtained throughout the process) 
• Other personal data, broadly defined65  
 
Health data is a broad category, and different laws define categories of data 
that merit special protection. For example, HIPAA protects “protected health 
information” (PHI), which is defined as “individually identifiable health 
information” that is “transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic 
media; or transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.”66 HIPAA 
does not cover the protection of health-related information that is not 
transmitted through the statutorily defined means or the protection of health 
information that may be arguably non-identifiable and does not protect other 
categories of information related to health. For example, Mason Marks has also 
identified “emerging medical data,” data from social media and other sources, 
that could effectively provide the same insights as traditional health data.67 This 
is a category of data that is not covered by existing U.S. laws on health privacy.  
 
Genetic information is defined in (among other places) the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), one of the leading genetic data 
laws in the United States. GINA defines genetic information, as, with respect to 
any individual,  “information about (i) such individual’s’ genetic tests, (ii) the 
genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of 
a disease or disorder in family members of such individual.”68 GINA defines a 
genetic test as a “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or 
 
64 For example, 23andMe’s study relied on its existing databank of genetic information 
collected previously. See Megan Molteni, Why Does Covid-19 Make Some People So Sick? Ask Their 
DNA, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/why-does-covid-19-make-some-
people-so-sick-ask-their-dna. 
65 The distinction between personally identifiable data and data deemed to not be 
personally identifiable has not been found to be useful in practice, as many forms of data can 
be re-identifiable. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLAL.REV.1701 (2010). 
But cf. Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011). 
66 45 CFR § 160.103 (2019). 
67 Mason Marks, Emergent Medical Data: Health Information Inferred by Artificial Intelligence, 11 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming (2021), ).https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554118. 
68 42 U.S.C.USCS § 300gg–91(d)(16) (2018). 
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metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes,” 
excluding (i) analysis of proteins or metabolites that does not detect genotypes, 
mutations, or chromosomal changes; or (ii) an analysis of proteins or 
metabolites that is directly related to a manifested disease, disorder, or 
pathological condition that could reasonably be detected by a healthcare 
professional with appropriate training and expertise in the field of medicine 
involved.69  
 
HIPAA also includes genetic information as potentially falling under the 
umbrella of PHI. The Privacy Rule “(1) revise[d] the definition of ‘‘health 
information’’ to make clear that the term includes ‘‘genetic information;’’ and (2) 
add[ed] definitions for the GINA-related terms of ‘‘family member,’’ ‘‘genetic 
information,’’ ‘‘genetic services,’’ ‘‘genetic test,’’ and ‘‘manifestation or 
manifested;’’70 HIPAA’s genetic information definition includes the categories of 
information covered under the definition of genetic information under GINA as 
well as “any request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical 
research which includes genetic services, by the individual or any family member 
of the individual.”71 
 
Some of the data collected or processed in the testing data lifecycle might 
qualify as genetic data—or might deserve the special protections afforded to 
genetic data. Genetic data is particularly important to protect due to the 
importance genes have to our conceptions of identity and self. Alondra Nelson 
has described the “special status afforded to DNA as the final arbiter of truth 
of identity”72 and has called DNA “the ultimate big data.”73 The unique 
sensitivity of genetic data is also important to keep in mind in the debate over 
immunity passports based on antibody tests. 
 
Additionally, health privacy laws often fail to recognize non-health 
information that is also at risk with health information disclosures. Other 
personal data may include demographic data, data on social or personal habits 
that may not be health-related in nature, as well as data that could appear on 
first glance to be unrelated to the COVID-19 testing lifecycle. Disclosure of 
non-health data can also lead to privacy harms. For example, one coronavirus 
outbreak in South Korea was traced to a nightlife area that included many clubs 
popular with the local LGBTQ community. In disclosing the source of the 
 
69 42 U.S.C.USCS § 300gg–91 (d)(17) (2018). 
70 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable 
Health Information, 74 Fed. Red.FR 51698 (Oct. 7, 2009). 
71 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019). 
72 ALONDRA NELSON, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF DNA: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND 
RECONCILIATION AFTER THE GENOME 4 (2016). 
73 Id. 
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outbreak, health authorities potentially jeopardized the safety of the LGBTQ 
people who had frequented the district in secret.74   
 
It is important to understand which types of data are being collected and 
processed throughout the COVID-19 testing lifecycle, because different types 
of data sometimes need different legal and regulatory protections. For example, 
health data and genetic data merit special protection under different laws and 
regulations in the U.S. sector-specific privacy regime. Personal data not directly 
related to health or genetics also merits protection, particularly personal data 
that is easily identifiable. Biological samples or specimens may need different 
security protections than digital data. Other data that does not fall easily into any 
of the above categories should not be excluded from protection either, 
particularly given the ability for downstream data aggregators to amass large data 
sets that could then lead to reidentification. 
 
4. Understanding the COVID-19 Testing Data Lifecycle 
 
To understand the data flow and lifecycle of data generated from testing, 
start at the beginning.  
 
First, a person gives a sample (biological or data, as in survey responses) to 
a primary data collector. This first phase—the primary point of collection—may 
involve multiple primary data collectors. For example, a person may go to a 
drive-through testing center, jointly managed by the state government, a local 
hospital, and private testing companies. Thus, at the primary point of collection, 
a number of parties may have control over the data and qualify as data 
controllers as traditionally understood. 
 
The primary data collection from COVID-19 testing takes place at a number 
of points of collection: traditional healthcare settings (e.g., hospitals, primary 
care practices); new testing facilities (e.g., COVID-19 specific drive-through 
testing centers)75; public and private research settings (e.g., 23andMe’s genetic 





75 Press Release, Governor Cuomo Opens the State’s First Drive-through COVID-19 
Mobile Testing Center in New Rochelle, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-opens-states-first-drive-through-covid-
19-mobile-testing-center-new-rochelle-0. 
76 Megan Molteni, Why Does Covid-19 Make Some People So Sick? Ask Their DNA, WIRED 
(Apr. 7, 2020),  https://www.wired.com/story/why-does-covid-19-make-some-people-so-
sick-ask-their-dna. 
77 Jeff Norris, New COVID-19 ‘Citizen Science’ Initiative Lets Any Adult with a Smartphone 
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networks.78 In early May 2020, the FDA approved the first at-home saliva test 
for COVID-19,79 following its emergency authorization for the first at-home 
nasal swab testing kit in April 2020.80 For this emergency authorization, the FDA 
relied81 on the public health emergency powers given to it under Section 564(a) 
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.82 Thus, an individual’s home 
setting may also be a location for primary collection of samples and data, and an 
individual (or friends or family) may be the primary collector of the sample. 
 
The second phase of the data lifecycle for testing data is analysis of the 
sample. In this phase, the primary data collector either (1) conducts analysis 
itself; or (2) transfers the data for analysis by another party. For example, a drive-
through testing center could transfer the biological samples to a lab for analysis. 
Alternatively, a hospital may have the resources to both collect a sample and 
analyze it in an in-house lab. An individual using a home testing kit could send 
in the kit to the lab. In this analysis phase of the COVID-19 data lifecycle, data 
may be accessed, stored, and shared by parties that may be data processors or 
may be both processor and controller.83 
 
The first two phases of the COVID-19 testing data lifecycle are relatively 
clear. However, as with all data collection, it is difficult to fully predict the flow 
of data the further downstream you get from the primary point of collection. 
Results of tests may be transferred to other entities, either by the individual who 
was tested, or by any of the testing data processors, data collectors, or data 
 
Help to Fight Coronavirus, U.C. SAN FRANCISCO (Mar. 30, 2020), 
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2020/03/417026/new-covid-19-citizen-science-initiative-lets-
any-adult-smartphone-help-fight. 
78 Science Friday: Citizen Scientists: Submit Your COVID-19 Symptoms (Or Lack Of Them), 
WNYC (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/citizen-science-covid-19; 
Paul Sisson, Door Knobs, Trash Cans, Gas Pumps: Citizen Scientists Search for Coronavirus on Everyday 
Surfaces, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (May 14, 2020); 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/health/story/2020-05-14/door-knobs-trash-
cans-gas-pumps-citizen-scientists-enlisted-to-help-find-coronavirus-on-everyday-surfaces. 
79 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., to Christian 
Bixby, Assistant Dir., Research & Clinical Lab Servs., Rutgers Clinical Genomics Lab., Rutgers 
Univ. (May 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137773/download; Sheila Kaplan & 
Natasha Singer, F.D.A. Clears First Home Saliva Test for Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/health/fda-coronavirus-spit-test.html. 
80 Katie Thomas & Natasha Singer, F.D.A. Authorizes First In-Home Test for Coronavirus, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/health/fda-in-home-
test-coronavirus.html. 
81 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, Food & Drug Admin. to Christian 
Bixby, Assistant Dir., Research & Clinical Lab Servs., Rutgers Clinical Genomics Lab., Rutgers 
Univ. (May 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/137773/download. 
82 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–3 (2018). 
83 Jones, Meg and Kaminski, Margot E., An American's Guide to the GDPR (June 5, 
2020). Denver Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2020. 
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controllers. The transfer may be done intentionally or unintentionally, for the 
purposes specified at point of collection or not. This may include releasing 
information to the public about people who may have been infected with the 
virus. For example, places of business may post notices if an employee tests 
positive, or local governments may post information about large events an 
infected person had visited. Data from various sources may eventually find its 
way to data aggregators, who may repackage the data with data from many 
sources, increasing the chances of reidentification and potential harm (including 
algorithmic harms) to data subjects. 
 
Understanding the lifecycle of testing data is key for identifying the points 
at which regulation can have the greatest impact on protecting privacy. 
 
5. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Testing Data Privacy 
 
It is helpful to break down the legal and regulatory landscape by identifying 
at which points law might apply to protect privacy rights. This includes 
identifying which actors the law can regulate, as well as identifying which actions 
or settings the law can govern. While testing for disease is not new, the scale at 
which testing has progressed is new and arguably not contemplated in current 
privacy laws. 
The American privacy regime lacks a comprehensive federal privacy 
regulation. However, the United States has a number of sector-specific privacy 
laws and regulations that would likely pertain to the type of testing done for 
COVID-19 response.  
 
a. Regulating by Data Type 
 
For the types of data gathered in testing, we can look to regulations and legal 
protections for health data, genetic data, and other data. There are a number of 
laws that create special protections for health information as well as genetic 
information (sometimes separately, sometimes categorized as health 
information). 
 
The United States also has federal laws specifically protecting privacy for 
health information. HIPAA,84 the HIPAA Privacy Rule codified in 2002,85 and 
 
84 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat 1936 (1996).) 
85 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§160, 164 (2019)); s). ee also Health Insurance 
Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 
162, 164 (2019)); ),HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390 
(Feb. 16, 2006) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019));). Modifications to the HIPAA 
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information 
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2009’s HITECH (the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act, particularly important for tightening legal protections in 
HIPAA) award special protection to personal health information. HIPAA 
includes protections for electronic health information transmission, primarily 
through the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule found in Section II. 
 
However, these protections are quite limited. First, the regulations only 
apply to “covered entities” and, to some extent, their “business associates.” 
Covered entities often include hospitals and clinics, but do not include many 
other actors that might be data collectors in the COVID-19 testing process. 
Under HIPAA, the covered entities that must comply with HIPAA obligations 
include health care providers (e.g., doctors, clinics, psychologists, dentists, 
nursing homes) that transmit information in an electronic form in connection 
with a transaction for which HIPAA applies. Covered entities also include health 
care clearinghouses (entities that process health information from other entities) 
as well as health plans (e.g., health insurance companies, HMOs, company health 
plans). For example, if there are no covered entities involved in the data lifecycle 
of a particular testing program, actors like university research centers would 
likely be able to evade HIPAA regulation, as would private companies like 
23andMe. This could easily happen, if non-covered entities engage in their own 
testing or data collection programs. These programs then would lack the 
protections awarded under a HIPAA-compliant regime. 
 
Second, HIPAA only awards protections to data that is electronically 
transmitted from a covered entity. While the regulation includes security 
requirements (under the Security Rule), there is little protection against more 
distributed downstream uses of data, which would be difficult to enforce. For 
example, the law does not include enforcement mechanisms for improper 
transfer of data by a third party who receives information from a business 
associate of a covered entity. Finally, HIPAA is a consent-based regime. That is, 
under HIPAA, covered entities and their business associates are free to collect, 
use, and share data as long as individuals provide their consent to such practices. 
Many scholars have noted the flaws of notice and consent regimes,86 and these 
flaws are readily apparent in the COVID-19 testing context. Furthermore, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) already relaxed some of 
these HIPAA restrictions, given the medical needs raised by the pandemic.87 It 
 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 
(2019)).). 
86 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
HARV.L. REV. REV.1880, 1894 (2013); Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice 
for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1505 (2018).. 
87 COVID-19 & HIPAA Bulletin: Limited Waiver of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties During a 
Nationwide Public 
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is likely that greater regulatory leniency may come as the pandemic progresses. 
 
In the United States, genetic data is given increased protections through 
genetic nondiscrimination laws like GINA and some state laws that protect 
information including genetic information. GINA, however, is quite limited, 
only regulating health plans and employers and only in the context of 
discrimination. Many have argued for expansion of legal protection for genetic 
information, potentially including new laws on genetic privacy88 and genetic 
discrimination.89 For example, Ifeoma Ajunwa has called for the creation of a 
new tort of genetic information disclosure as well as more rigorous informed 
consent guidelines for genetic testing.90 Ajunwa has also called for strengthening 
GINA to add a disparate impact cause of action,91 addressing gaps in the anti-
discrimination law.  
 
Another key law for genetic privacy in this context is the 21st Century Cures 
Act, which gives research subjects certain safeguards over their genetic 
 
Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2020),) 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin-
508.pdf;; Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the 





Office of Civil Rightshttps://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf; 
, COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics, Other First Responders and 
Public Health Authorities, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf; Office 
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEPT. 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr-
bulletin-3-28-20.pdf; Office of Civil Rights, FAQs on Telehealth and HIPAA During the COVID-
19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf. 
88 Mason Marks & Tiffany Li, DNA Donors Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic 
Privacy, STAT (May 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-genetic-




89  Mason Marks & Tiffany Li, DNA Donors Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic 
Privacy, STAT (May 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-genetic-
privacy-nih; Megan Molteni, The US Urgently Needs New Genetic Privacy Laws, WIRED (May 1, 
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-urgently-needs-new-genetic-privacy-laws., 
90 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Torts and Contract Law Issues, 75 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1225 (2014). 
91 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.Rights- Civil L. L. REV. 
75 ( 2016). 
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information in the context of federally funded research.92 The 21st Century Cures 
Act includes, for example, that certain researchers “shall not disclose or provide 
any other person not connected with the research the name of [patient or test 
subject] or any information, document, or biospecimen that contains 
identifiable, sensitive information about such an individual and that was created 
or compiled for purposes of research.”93 However, disclosure of the protected 
types of information is still allowed under certain conditions, including “for the 
purposes of other scientific research that is in compliance with applicable 
Federal regulations governing the protection of human subjects in research”94 
as well as if the disclosure if “made with the consent of the individuals to whom 
the information, document, or biospecimen pertains.”95 It is also important to 
note that the privacy protections for research subjects, patients, and data donors 
under the 21st Century Cures Act includes a limitation that limits the use of 
“identifiable, sensitive information” in legal process, including preventing such 
information from being admissible as evidence.96  
 
Thus, if genetic information is collected as part of the coronavirus testing 
data lifecycle, there are a few specific contexts where genetic privacy legal 
protections would apply. However, with GINA and the 21st Century Cures Act, 
as with HIPAA, consent is a qualifying exception that can eliminate privacy 
protections in many cases. It is quite possible that a research subject (e.g., person 
getting a COVID-19 test as part of a larger medical-research study) could sign 
away their rights without fully understanding the scope of their consent. 
Furthermore, these laws protect against discrimination and against specific types 
of data transfer. They do not protect broader privacy rights. 
 
Outside the U.S. federal context, other jurisdictions also often create special 
regulations for health data, biometric data, or genetic data. For example, the 
E.U.’s General Data Protection Regulation regards health data as a special 
category, thus necessitating special protections for collection and processing.97 
A number of U.S. states also have particular laws that govern biometric and 
health information, including the Illinois Biometric Information Protection Act 
(BIPA).98 BIPA is currently one of the strongest biometric privacy laws in the 
United States. Under BIPA, businesses that collect biometric information must 
receive written consent from individuals before data collection, and they must 
provide notice on policies for data usage and retention. Critically, BIPA allows 
 
92 42 U.S.C. §USC 201 (2018). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)USC 201(B) (2018). 
94 42 U.S.C. §USC 241(d)(1)(C)(iv) (2018). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)USC 201 (C)(iii) (2018). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)USC 201 (E) (2018). 
97 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2016 O.J. 
(L 119) 1, Recital 35. 
98 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ILCS14 (2019). 
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for a private right of action. Other states are also considering similar legislation. 
 
b. Regulating by Actor and Setting 
 
Some data processors and controllers in the testing-data lifecycle would be 
considered covered entities under HIPAA, GINA, or other laws and 
regulations. Many public institutions, particularly public-health institutions, 
would find themselves regulated by one or more of these laws and regulations. 
However, as noted, many health-privacy laws have gaps—the most glaring of 
which is the lack of accountability for private actors, especially actors that are 
not traditionally healthcare providers. 
 
For private data controllers and data processors, the FTC has broad 
authority over privacy practices.99 The common way the FTC has held 
companies to account over privacy violations has been to note where companies 
have failed their publicly stated obligations and promises to consumers, thus 
falling under the FTC’s purview to enforce rules on unfair or deceptive 
practices.100 Data collectors like 23andMe and private research or health 
companies could be subject to FTC jurisdiction and thus enforcement in this 
way. The FTC also has broad enforcement authority over companies that engage 
in unfair, misleading, or fraudulent activity, which would include any testing 
actors that misrepresent their testing capabilities or other abilities, in addition to 
and including privacy or security practices. State attorneys general also have 
authority to bring actions against companies for privacy violations as well as 
unfair practices or misleading or fraudulent activity. 
 
No system is perfectly secure, and every actor in the data lifecycle has the 
potential for suffering a data breach. If this were to happen, state data breach 
laws would likely apply. In case of data breach, companies could be found to 
have violated their obligations under HIPAA’s Security Rule and Breach 
Notification Rule, as well as their obligations to act in ways that are not 
misleading or unrepresentative of their stated practices (thus triggering FTC 
enforcement). For organizations not covered under HIPAA, the FTC Health 
Breach Notification Rule101 requires compliance with notification procedures in 
case of data breach related to health information. Additionally, other parties 
involved in the data lifecycle may have a claim against the breached party, on 
the basis that the breached party failed in its contractual obligations to other 
parties.  
 
99 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).); 
100 See, e.g., https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-
ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were 
101 16 C.F.R. 318 (2019). 
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Many of the harms from COVID-19 testing relate to downstream data 
usage. Here, the law provides far less protection.102 On a fundamental level, it is 
difficult for individuals to know exactly where their data goes, past the initial 
point of collection, or to grasp the full extent of potential data harms—making 
it next to impossible for individuals to knowingly consent103 to all the 
downstream privacy harms that could occur. Data may be shared, sold, or rented 
with third parties, that could include other actors within the testing ecosystem 
as well as unrelated parties, like other research centers for related and unrelated 
projects, as well as commercial actors, like companies seeking to profit from 
tailored marketing and behavioral advertising,104 and government actors, like 
law-enforcement agencies seeking to use genetic information to identify 
suspects.105  
 
Law enforcement can access data, even health and genetic data, stored in 
private or public collections, through various means, including simply buying 
data outright. Data collectors or data holders may also sell or freely share data 
with law enforcement, which could lead to greater surveillance and related 
harms, particularly important for marginalized communities. Genetic 
information is particularly interesting to mention, as the genetic information of 
any one person could potentially be used to identify many people in their genetic 
family line. In numerous cases, law enforcement have been able to identify 
potential suspects by matching DNA samples with DNA data of distant 
relatives.106 There are few laws, or even proposed laws, that would protect 
against these downstream privacy harms.  
 
Few laws even contemplate data brokers, aggregators who buy data from 
multiple sources, package that data together, and then resell to other parties. The 
privacy harms of data collection are amplified by the process of aggregation 
(through what Daniel Solove has called “the multiplier problem”107), as data 
 
102 For example, while HIPAA arguably should apply to business associates and business 
associate subcontractors, in practice, the law is rarely enforced against any actors that are not 
qualified entities. 
103 Charlotte Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1505 (2018). 
104 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 273 (2012). 
105 Megan Molteni, The Key to Cracking Cold Cases Might Be Genealogy Sites, WIRED (June 1, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/police-will-crack-a-lot-more-cold-cases-with-dna. 
106 Megan Molteni, The Key to Cracking Cold Cases Might Be Genealogy Sites, WIRED (June 1, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/police-will-crack-a-lot-more-cold-cases-with-dna. 
107 Daniel J. Solove, Why the Law Often Doesn’t Recognize Privacy and Data Security Harms, 
TEACHPRIVACY (July 9, 2014), https://teachprivacy.com/law-often-doesnt-recognize-privacy-
data-security-harms. 
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becomes more identifiable with more data from other sources.108 For example, 
a company like 23andMe could collect symptom information from its 
consumers, match that with the genetic information from its database, and sell 
that to a third party data broker. That data broker could purchase the data and 
resell it to insurers who could then identify which people, or which groups of 
people, would be more likely to contract COVID-19, then increasing the rates 
for insurance for those people. These downstream data harms are especially 
problematic given the likelihood of future connected health technologies, both 
public and private, including what Andrea Matwyshyn has termed the “Internet 
of Bodies.”109 There are no federal laws, and only a few state laws and proposals, 
that deal with data brokers specifically. U.S. laws do not protect against these 
downstream, distributed harms. Furthermore, even where law could regulate 
against these harms, there has often been a lack of strong enforcement actions 
by regulators. 
 
B.  Immunity Passports and Verification Mechanisms 
 
A number of people have proposed using immunity passports or certificates 
that would indicate someone has developed antibody resistance to COVID-
19.110 In April 2020, Germany began conducting Europe’s first nationwide 
COVID-19 antibody testing program.111 Researchers at the Hemholtz Centre 
for Infection Research in Braunschweig proposed a project which would include 
 
108 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1880 (2013).., 
109 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 1 (2019). 
110 See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Bryce Nesbitt, The ‘Certified Recovered’ from Covid-19 Could Lead 
the Economic Recovery, STAT (Apr. 6. 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/06/the-
certified-recovered-from-covid-19-could-lead-the-economic-recovery; Opinion, Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel, We Can Safely Restart the Economy in June. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html; Jason 
Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right Antibodies, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 2020),https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/31/coronavirus-serology-
blood-tests/; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-coronavirus-
antibodies.html; Veronika Hackenbroch, Große Antikörperstudie Soll Immunität Der Deutschen 
Gegen Covid-19 Feststellen, DER SPIEGEL (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosse-antikoerper-studie-soll-
immunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd73-48c17c1bad23; Carolyn Y. 
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mass testing for antibodies as well as immunity certificates (“similar to a 
vaccination certificate”112) that would allow people certain exceptions from 
COVID-19 restrictions, e.g., limitations on travel or non-essential work.113 
Scientists in Italy have also proposed similar programs, as has New York 
Governor Andrew Cuomo.114 
 
Immunity passports or certificates come with many issues, including privacy. 
Immunity verification requires testing to determine the presence of antibodies 
that could imply immunity (temporary or permanent). As discussed above, 
testing in general generates a host of privacy issues, regardless of which party is 
collecting, processing, sharing, or controlling the data. Requiring or encouraging 
immunity verification for employment, housing, education, or even for entering 
a movie theater or shopping center could lead to an increase in testing, and thus 
a compounding of the privacy harms related to testing. Electronic transfer of 
immunity-related data also raises privacy risks, which may necessitate new 
guidelines around HIPAA and other laws that govern health information 
(potentially including Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) limitations for 




112 Lydia Smith, Germany to Introduce Coronavirus ‘Immunity Certificates’ for Recovered Public, 
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodies-tests-general-
public-immunity-certificates-1494934 (quoting in translation 
https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-grosse-antikoerper-studie-soll-
immunitaet-der-deutschen-feststellen-a-c8c64a33-5c0f-4630-bd73-48c17c1bad23). 
113 Lydia Smith, Germany to Introduce Coronavirus ‘Immunity Certificates’ for Recovered Public, 
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodies-tests-general-
public-immunity-certificates-1494934. 
114 Jason Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right Antibodies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-
coronavirus-antibodies.html. 
115 See, e.g., COVID-19 & HIPAA Bulletin: Limited Waiver of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties 
During a Nationwide Public 
Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2020), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin-
508.pdf; Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the 
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 17, 
2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergency-
preparedness/notification-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html; Office of Civil 
Rights, COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics, Other First Responders 
and Public Health Authorities, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf; Office 
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEPT. 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr-
bulletin-3-28-20.pdf; Office of Civil Rights, FAQs on Telehealth and HIPAA During the COVID-
19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf. 
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Encouraging testing for immunity verification can lead to individuals feeling 
compelled to take tests, regardless of their concerns over privacy or other issues. 
People may feel compelled to participate in testing, particularly if testing is 
necessary for immunity verification that can lead to employment. This lack of 
control over personal health data could be harmful for privacy, or at least to a 
person’s perception of their own control over personal privacy. Normalizing 
this form of widespread testing and sharing of private health or genetic data with 
multiple corporate and government interests could also create change in our 
society’s expectations of privacy, with harmful consequences for future privacy 
norms and laws. 
 
Conditioning employment, housing, education, travel, or other rights and 
privileges on immunity verification could have dangerous consequences. 
Immunity passport or verification programs could create a lasting shift in social 
norms, laying the groundwork for future programs that use genetics or health 
status as conditions for accessing certain rights and privileges. On the extreme 
end, this line of argumentation could be used to justify programs that edge close 
to eugenics,116 privileging some based on health, physical ability, or innate 
genetic characteristics. Normalizing immunological discrimination could pave 
the way for a loosening of discrimination laws and practices generally, 
particularly related to health discrimination, as well as for certain sectors, like 
employment. 
 
These problems with immunity passports have historical antecedents. 
Kathryn Olivarius has written about the complex interplay between health and 
capital in the “immunocapital” economy of the Yellow Fever epidemic of the 
early 1900s.117 Connecting the past immunity economy to the proposed 
immunity passports of the COVID-19 era, Olivarius writes: 
 
Immunity on a case-by-case basis did permit the economy to 
expand, but it did so unevenly: to the benefit of those already 
atop the social ladder, and at the expense of everyone else. When 
a raging virus collided with the forces of capitalism, 
immunological discrimination became just one more form of 
bias in a region already premised on racial, ethnic, gender and 
financial inequality.118 
 
Widespread immunity verification programs could effectively create the 
 
116 Godwin’s Law, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin's_law. 
117 Kathryn Olivarius, Immunity, Capital, and Power in Antebellum New Orleans, 124 AM. HIST. 
REV. 425 (2019). 
118 Kathryn Olivarius, The Dangerous History of Immunoprivilege, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/coronavirus-immunity-passports.html. 
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“immunological discrimination” Olivarius describes, leading to discriminatory 
effects on marginalized and disadvantaged groups. For example, if some jobs 
are conditioned on immunity verification, people might be willing to voluntarily 
infect themselves with COVID-19 in order to gain the immunity, and by proxy, 
the immunity verification needed for employment. This particular risk to 
individual health would likely be greater for the unemployed and 
underemployed, and other people who would find the financial incentive strong 
enough to overcome the risks to their own health. As Olivarius notes, the use 
of immunity verification as condition for employment shifts the burden on the 
working classes to become “acclimated” to the virus, not on those in power to 
invest in societal infrastructure.119 
 
Additionally, immunity testing and verification may not be available equally 
to all people. For example, people who lack medical insurance (particularly in 
countries like the United States, without free or low-cost public healthcare) may 
be unwilling or unable to get the testing needed to receive immunity verification. 
Thus, if immunity verification were to become a standard, already disadvantaged 
people would not be able to access the same benefits from immunity verification 
that others would.  
 
Black people, indigenous people, and people from other marginalized 
groups may have greater resistance to enrolling in any public health database or 
government data collection program, without strong assurances that their data 
will not be used against them and their communities, given historical examples 
of the law enforcement overreach. For example, some may fear that their genetic 
material will be accessible by law enforcement, as has been shown through 
government use of commercial DNA databases,120 which could result in 
threatening consequences for groups who already disproportionately suffer 
from the effects of institutional and structural racism in public health and 
policing. Undocumented people may fear that their genetic data will be used to 
link them to other undocumented people, thus leading to harmful immigration 
consequences for themselves and their loved ones.121 They, too, would not be 
able to benefit from immunity verification.  
 
119 Kathryn Olivarius, The Dangerous History of Immunoprivilege, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/coronavirus-immunity-passports.html. 
120 Mason Marks & Tiffany Li, DNA Donors Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic 
Privacy, STAT (May 30, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-genetic-
privacy-nih. 
121 Megan Molteni, How DNA Testing at the US-Mexico Border Will Actually Work, WIRED 
(May 2, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/how-dna-testing-at-the-us-mexico-border-will-
actually-work; DNA Tests at Border: DHS to Start Testing to Catch People Posing as Families, CBS 
DENVER (May 2, 2019),https://www.wired.com/story/how-dna-testing-at-the-us-mexico-
border-will-actually-work/; https://denver.cbslocal.com/2019/05/02/dna-tests-border-
department-homeland-security. 
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Using immunity verification as a limiting factor for fundamental rights like 
employment, education, and travel could raise constitutional issues as well, 
though it is arguable that the government’s compelling interest in protecting 
public health in the middle of an active pandemic could outweigh many potential 
concerns at least for limited, short term programs. However, as the legal and 
regulatory landscape surrounding immunity passports is extremely bare, it would 
be difficult for anyone to challenge an incorrect immunity verification and 
defend their rights. This difficulty in contestation would be especially 
pronounced for those who lack the resources and access to legal support. 
Furthermore, it is likely that any programs that develop during pandemic 
response will have lasting effects on laws and norms for the future. 
 
Current U.S. discrimination law likely does not prevent the use of immunity 
verification programs like immunity passports. The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) protects individuals against 
discrimination based on genetic information, but this law is limited to two 
sectors: health insurance and employment. GINA prevents health insurers from 
denying coverage to individuals based on genetic predisposition and prevents 
employers from using genetic information for hiring, firing, promotion, and 
related employment decisions.  
 
While it might seem that GINA would protect genetic privacy in the context 
of testing and immunity passports, this may not be the case. GINA does not 
protect employees from employer surveillance of their genetic information, 
potentially including information related to coronavirus testing or immunity 
verification. Furthermore, GINA allows employers to request, require, or 
purchase genetic information of employees in certain circumstances, including 
to comply with certification requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
and other leave laws and policies, as well as genetic monitoring programs 
required by law as well, as well as data from sources that are commercially and 
publicly available, and data that an employee voluntarily consents to giving. 
While employers are generally prevented from sharing or exposing genetic 
information, they are allowed to do so under some circumstances. Additionally, 
it is unclear if immunity information would fall under the scope of GINA, as 
the information included in an immunity verification passport could potentially 
exclude genetic information.  
 
Particularly important is the fact that GINA does not include a cause of 
action for genetic discrimination based on disparate impact, a failing Ifeoma 
Ajunwa has noted. Ajunwa argues that such a clause should be added to GINA 
because:  
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(1) ease of access to genetic testing and the insecurity of genetic 
information has increased the likelihood of genetic discrimination in 
employment;  
(2) the addition of a disparate impact clause is in line with the 
precedent set by prior employment discrimination laws;  
(3) the EEOC has declared that proof of deliberate acquisition of 
genetic discrimination is not necessary to establish a violation of GINA, 
likewise, proof of intent to discriminate should not be required to 
demonstrate that there has been genetic discrimination;  
(4) and finally, real world instances of genetic testing have shown 
that facially neutral testing may result in racial disparities.122 
 
Adding a disparate-action clause to GINA would protect against most of 
the genetic discrimination harms raised by the use of genetic information in the 
modern, Big Data era, outside of the limited contexts GINA currently governs. 
With the greater scale of testing data, the insecurity of genetic information has 
likely increased the likelihood of genetic discrimination, particularly enhanced 
by the concept of conditioning employment on immunity verification. Adding 
a disparate impact clause would be in line with prior precedent, and past EEOC 
declarations remain current. Perhaps most importantly, there is historical 
precedent for the racial disparities and discriminatory impact of genetic testing 
based on immunity.123  
 
If GINA, the law specifically concerning genetic discrimination, might not 
fully protect genetic privacy rights for individuals in the context of immunity 
passports, one might wonder if the ADA would serve. The ADA protects 
against discrimination in many contexts, including employment. However, here 
again, the ADA is insufficient to protect individuals from the discriminatory 
harms of enforced immunity-verification programs. The ADA allows employers 
to screen out individuals by applying qualification standards, which could 
include the requirement “that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the 
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”124 Employers are also 
allowed to conduct “voluntary medical examinations, including voluntary 
medical histories” and “make inquiries into the ability of an employee to 
perform job-related functions.”125 In fact, the EEOC in May released guidance 
 
122 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75, 79 (2016). 
123 Kathryn Olivarius, Immunity, Capital, and Power in Antebellum New Orleans, 124 AM. HIST. 





124 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018). 
125 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2018). 
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on interpreting ADA protections in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and 
suggested that employers may institute testing of employees for exposure to the 
virus.126 
 
To address the harms of genetic discrimination raised by COVID-19 testing 
and immunity-verification proposals, we must strengthen protections in GINA 
and the ADA. This can come through new genetic-privacy laws,127 through 
genetic-privacy provisions in a future national privacy law, or perhaps in an 
algorithmic-discrimination or algorithmic-accountability law, as the privacy 
harms of new technologies are heavily amplified by the impacts of Big Data, 
machine learning, and artificial-intelligence systems today. 
 
C.  Contact Tracing 
 
In addition to testing for coronavirus exposure, states have also turned to 
contact tracing programs as key parts of pandemic response. Contact tracing in 
this context refers to the practice of tracing the contacts of a person identified 
as having been exposed to COVID-19, in an effort to halt the further onward 
spread of the virus.128  
 
Contact tracing attempts to quickly track and stop the spread of COVID-19 
by starting with each person who tests positive for the virus. When a person is 
infected with a virus like COVID-19, the infected person is contagious for a 
period of time. During this time, the infected person is able to infect others with 
the virus. People who come in close physical contact with that person 
(“contacts”) thus have a higher risk of infection. Contact tracing attempts to 
identify these people quickly, so that the contacts of the infected person can take 
steps to also get tested and to practice social isolating, to prevent potentially 
infected contacts from spreading the virus further. 
 
1. Contact Tracing Principles 
 
Contact tracing starts with confirming a person has or had a COVID-19 
 
126 What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other 
EEO Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-
act-and-other-eeo-laws. 
127 But see Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetic Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special 
Genetics Legislation?, 79?. WASH. U. L.Q. 669 (2001).Review 
128 Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Contact Tracing Works and How It Can Help Reopen the 
Country, NPR (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2020/04/14/833726999/how-contact-tracing-can-help-fight-coronavirus; Contact 
Tracing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2017), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-
detail/contact-tracing. 
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viral infection. Contact tracing is then implemented to study and stop the further 
spread of the virus by alerting the infected person to isolate and by alerting all 
people who may have been in contact with the infected person to also monitor 
their own symptoms and isolate if needed. 
 
The World Health Organization breaks down contact tracing into three 
basic steps: (1) contact identification; (2) contact listing; and (3) contact follow-
up.129 In contact identification, steps are taken to identify all the individuals that 
may have been in contact with a person who had the COVID-19 virus during 
the period of potential viral transmission. In contact listing, contacts are 
informed of their contact status as well as steps they should take to protect their 
own health and the health of others. In contact follow-up, contact tracing 
program administrators follow up with contacts to monitor for symptoms and 
test for signs of infection.  
 
Different types of contact tracing programs have emerged in response to 
the novel coronavirus pandemic: human contact tracing and digital contact 
tracing. Digital contact tracing has come in two primary conceptions: Bluetooth-
based, “decentralized” contact tracing, and centralized contact tracing, often 
through cell-phone location data or also through Bluetooth-based data. Each of 
these forms of contact tracing programs has its own portfolio of privacy 
concerns, and different states have implemented one or more of them. Thus, it 
is necessary to discuss each form of contact tracing program in order to attempt 
to grasp a holistic overview of the privacy issues raised by contact tracing in the 
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
Contact tracing is not a new concept but rather an accepted and tested 
process used in a variety of epidemiology and public health contexts. However, 
the technologies used for digital contact tracing are new and relatively untested 
at scale, and these new technologies raise interesting societal issues. The clash 
between human and digital contact tracing also brings to light debates regarding 
automation and the ability to use machines to replicate or replace human work. 
Additionally, the privacy and security problems with digital contact tracing 
proposals reflect the changing nature of our society’s relationship with digital 
privacy, and the ways in which Big Data and the increasingly imbalanced nature 
of the data economy have shaped consumer expectations of privacy. 
 
2. Human Contact Tracing 
 
Governments around the world have implemented mass contact-tracing 
programs. For example, the state of Massachusetts created a statewide contact-
 
129 Contact Tracing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2017), https://www.who.int/news-
room/q-a-detail/contact-tracing. 
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tracing program, hiring 1,000 new contact tracers as part of human contact-
tracing programs.130 The city of San Francisco launched a program training 150 
volunteers to add to the existing contact-tracing programs from their city public-
health department.131 
 
Human contact tracing, or manual contact tracing, refers to contract tracing 
done through manual identification of contacts through non-automated means, 
as well as contact listing and contact follow-up done through manual, non-
automated means. Traditionally, contact tracing has meant contact tracing as 
done manually by humans. However, with this global pandemic in an age of 
increasingly digitized services, contact tracing through automated technologies 
has emerged as a contender, for better or worse.  
 
a. Human Contact Tracing Data Lifecycle 
 
Human contact tracing describes a process that has been used in 
epidemiological and public health contexts prior to but also including the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The process is as follows132:  
 
First, a confirmed infected person speaks to a contact tracer, a person 
fulfilling a contact tracing role. In this conversation, the contact tracer asks 
questions of the infected person, with an eye toward identifying contacts. These 
conversations often take place in a one-on-one setting over the phone. For 
example, a contact tracer from a state health department could call a person who 
tested positive of COVID-19 and ask for a list of everyone the infected person 
had come into contact with in the last 2 weeks.  
 
Contact tracers can be healthcare professionals, public health workers, or 
dedicated contact tracing staff. In Massachusetts, which launched a robust 
human contact tracing program, this identification stage is done through one-
on-one calls between the infected person and a contact tracer (hired by the state 
program, in partnership with a medical nonprofit, Partners in Health).133 Contact 
 
130 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contact-
tracing.html. 
131 Kristen Sze, EXCLUSIVE: San Francisco Launches Initiative to Trace Every Single COVID-
19 Case and Contact, ABC7 NEWS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://abc7news.com/san-francisco-contact-
tracing-coronavirus-tracnig-bay-area-lockdown-shelter-in-place/6090943. 
132 Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Contact Tracing Works and How It Can Help Reopen the 
Country, NPR (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2020/04/14/833726999/how-contact-tracing-can-help-fight-coronavirus. 
133 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contact-
tracing.html. 
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tracers receive information about infected persons through state databases that 
store results of coronavirus tests. The contact tracer then calls the infected 
person by phone and creates a list of all people the person had been in contact 
with in the 48 hours before the person’s symptoms began. 
 
Second, contact tracers will call or otherwise notify all contacts that they 
were exposed to someone who tested positive of COVID-19, informing these 
contacts of their risks as well as how to protect themselves and others from the 
virus and its effects. Contact tracers may suggest that contacts perform such 
actions as monitoring their own symptoms, self-quarantining, or trying to get 
their own tests for viral infection. In the Massachusetts contact tracing program, 
contact tracers attempt to call each contact, calling three times in succession “to 
signal the call’s importance.”134 If the contact picks up the phone, the contact 
tracer then informs them that they may have been expose to the virus, walks 
them through common symptoms and quarantine recommendations, and 
explains where they can get further help if needed. These conversations can take 
thirty to forty minutes.135 
 
In an ongoing final stage of the process, contact tracers follow up with 
contacts to monitor symptoms and spread of the virus. This can be done 
informally or through rigorously monitored programs. In South Korea,136 for 
example, contact tracers follow up with contacts on a routine basis and request 
or mandate that contacts track and submit their symptoms to a government 
database. 
 
Human contact tracing has its benefits and drawbacks, when compared to 
digital contact tracing programs. Finding out that you may have been exposed 
to the virus can be a frightening or worrying experience, and it can be helpful to 
have a human there to guide that first conveying of information. Public-health 
officials, taking lessons from contact tracing sexually transmitted infections such 
as HIV, have learned “to talk to people in a way that’s not stigmatizing and will 
encourage people to get on board with the request to self-isolate or share their 
contacts,” according to Jeff Engel, senior advisor for COVID-19 to the Council 
 
134 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contact-
tracing.html. 
135 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contact-
tracing.html. 
136 Max S. Kim, South Korea is Watching Quarantined Citizens with a Smartphone App, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Mar. 6, 2020), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/06/905459/coronavirus-south-korea-
smartphone-app-quarantine. 
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of State and Territorial Epidemiologists.137 It is likely that an automated process 
cannot duplicate the social and emotional benefits of human contact tracing, 
perhaps similar to the same issues we see with the use of care robots in times of 
crisis.  
 
It is difficult to calculate the social benefit of having human contact in the 
contact tracing process. However, it is possible to calculate the financial costs 
of contact tracing programs, which some governments may find too 
expensive.138 On the other hand, hiring unemployed individuals to serve as 
contact tracers could create an economic stimulus in a time when 
unemployment is high. Perhaps the greatest flaw of the human contact-tracing 
programs isn’t the cost but the difficulty of scaling a personal, one-to-one 
approach to a global pandemic. 
 
b. Human Contact Tracing’s Privacy Impact 
 
For a holistic analysis of the privacy issues related to human contact tracing, 
we can start once again with the types of data that are collected and processed, 
as well as the different actors involved with contact tracing.  
 
Contact tracers receive information about the infected person to facilitate 
the contact identification stage (e.g., phone interviews). This information can 
include name, phone number, address, as well as health information (at the very 
least, a positive COVID-19 test result). During the identification conversations, 
infected persons may share the names and contact information of potential 
contacts, as well as other information, including information about the infected 
person’s activities and locations in the days prior to the start of their symptoms. 
As these are phone calls between two potentially unpredictable human beings, 
any number of other types of information could be shared in the identification 
stage. Similarly, in the contact listing stage, which consists of conversations with 
contacts, many types of data may be shared—including identifying information 
as well as others.  
 
Some of the information collected during human contact tracing can include 
health information, as defined in HIPAA and state laws. Contact tracers may be 
acting on behalf of entities that would be governed under HIPAA, including 
healthcare providers, which could mean that transmission of health information 
 
137 Selena Simmons-Duffin, How Contact Tracing Works and How It Can Help Reopen the 
Country, NPR (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2020/04/14/833726999/how-contact-tracing-can-help-fight-coronavirus. 
138 Ellen Barry, An Army of Virus Tracers Takes Shape in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/us/coronavirus-massachusetts-contact-
tracing.html. 
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would have to comply with HIPAA and similar regulations. Contact tracers may 
also be acting through state and municipal public-health departments, which 
would not necessarily be covered entities that have to comply with HIPAA 
restrictions on health information. However, most of the entities conducting 
COVID-19 tests would likely qualify as HIPAA covered entities; thus, 
organizations receiving health information would likely have to at least comply 
with the requirements for business associates under HIPAA. Laws like GINA 
and the 21st Century Cures Act protect the confidentiality of patient health 
information used for federally-funded research.  
 
There are some risks to privacy and security that come with human contact-
tracing programs, particularly during a pandemic in which many would work 
from home. The more people have access to any data (including health 
information), the more risk there is that data may be exposed, even 
inadvertently. As it is likely many contact tracers may work remotely, it may be 
difficult to monitor whether contact tracers are practicing strong cybersecurity 
hygiene in protecting information. For example, it is difficult to know if any 
contact tracers are separately recording or writing down information from 
conversations, or if there are other people in the room while the contact tracer 
is working. It is possible that digital contact-tracing programs could have less of 
this form of distributed risk, as well as less room for human error contributing 
to privacy and security risks. There are a number of data breach disclosure laws 
across states that may come into play if information were to be exposed. 
 
3. Digital Contact Tracing 
 
In the COVID-19 pandemic, digital contact tracing has emerged as a public-
health response tool, for perhaps the first time on such a large national and 
global scale.139 In contrast to human contact tracing, digital contact tracing relies 
on digital, often automated, “contact tracing apps” that aid in identifying 
potential contacts of infected individuals. Digital contact tracing can also include 
digital, sometimes app-based, means of informing contacts of their potential 
exposure and the associated risks and recommendations. The follow-up 
capabilities of digital contact tracing programs are various and can include 
simple email reminders to required enrollment in apps that track symptoms.  
 
Two primary forms of digital contact tracing have become popular:140 first, 
 
139 Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tate Ryan-Mosley & Bobbie Johnson, A Flood of Coronavirus 
Apps Are Tracking Us. Now It’s Timei to Keep Track of Them.. MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020), 
Review.https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-
tracing-tracker. 
140 Cristina Criddle & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus Contact-Tracingcontact-tracing: World Split Between 
Two Types of App, BBC (May 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52355028. 
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a centralized approach, often utilizing cell-phone location data; second, a 
decentralized approach, often using a short-range Bluetooth standard. Both 
types of digital contact-tracing programs have their benefits and drawbacks, not 
the least of which relate to privacy impacts of individuals and groups. 
 
a. Decentralized Digital Contact Tracing 
 
While each proposed digital contact-tracing application is different, 
generally, decentralized contact-tracing apps use short-range Bluetooth 
technology to determine proximity between individuals at certain points in time. 
The concept involves individuals (ideally a high percentage141 of the populace) 
downloading the app. Some of these apps would run on background, and some 
would need to be active on a person’s mobile device to be useful. If a person 
tests positive for COVID-19, that person would update their status with the app 
(or, in some cases, another entity could update the app). The decentralized 
digital contact-tracing apps would then utilize “a record of anonymous key 
codes exchanged between phones” to determine which other individuals (who 
had the app installed or active) had been in proximity with the infected person 
during the contagious period.142  
 
Decentralized contact-tracing apps have been called “privacy-preserving.”143 
These privacy-preserving proposals include the Decentralized Privacy-
Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) project,144 the East Coast145 PACT,146 the 
 
141 Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmission and Ease Us Out of 
Lockdown, OXFORD (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-
digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-
lockdown. 
142 Kylie Foy, Bluetooth Signals From Your Smartphone Could Automate Covid-19 Contact Tracing While 
Preserving Privacy, MIT NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://news.mit.edu/2020/bluetooth-covid-19-
contact-tracing-0409. 
143 For example, the ACLU released a white paper on digital contact tracing that 
specifically noted DP-3T, East Coast PACT, and TCN as privacy-preserving proposals. Daniel 
Kahn Gillmor, Principles for Technology-Assisted Contact-Tracing, AM. C.L. UNION (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.aclu.org/report/aclu-white-paper-principles-technology-assisted-contact-tracing. 
144 Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing, GITHUB, https://github.com/DP-3T. 
145 Informal differentiation suggested by the team behind the “East Coast PACT,” upon 
noting the accidental similarity in acronym. See Ronald L. Rivest et al., The PACT Protocol 
Specification, PACT (Apr. 8, 2020), https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-
PACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf. 
146 PACT: PRIVATE AUTOMATED CONTACT TRACING, https://pact.mit.edu; Ronald L. 
Rivest et al., PACT: Private Automated Contact Tracing (Apr. 7, 2020), https://pact.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/MIT-PACT-ONEPAGER-2020-04-07-B.pdf; Ronald L. Rivest et 
al., The PACT Protocol Specification, PACT (Apr. 8, 2020), https://pact.mit.edu/wp-
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West Coast PACT,147 and TCN.148 European states and researchers have 
supported the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-
PT).149 These decentralized digital contact-tracing apps all have similarities in 
their protocol design.150 Some researchers involved with these apps have 
suggested solutions for increasing interoperability, allowing solutions to develop 
in parallel and potentially exchange information (e.g., users of multiple apps 
would be pinged if they were found to have been in proximity with an infected 
person), aiding widespread adoption and use.151  
 
Perhaps the leading commercial proposal is an approach developed by 
Apple and Google in partnership.152 Through the joint effort, Apple and Google 
launched a “comprehensive solution that includes application programming 
interfaces (APIs) and operating system-level technology to assist in enabling 
contact tracing.”153 An API is a computer-programing interface that defines 
interactions between software components or applications, allowing 
applications to call and request data. The Apple and Google proposal performs 
a different function than the other decentralized digital contact-tracing 
proposals, in that it provides an API that can be used to allow communication 
between other applications, as opposed to releasing an application that can stand 
on its own. Google and Apple specify this as an “Exposure Notification 
system,” rather than a contact-tracing application,154 perhaps for that reason. 
 
Some nations and states have deployed contact tracing apps. However, these 
apps have not reached a high percentage of the population in most regions 
where the apps have launched. For example, as of July 2020, only 14.4% of the 
 
147 Justin Chan et al., PACT: Privacy-Sensitive Protocols and Mechanisms for Mobile 
Contact Tracing (May 7, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
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149 PAN-EUROPEAN PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROXIMITY TRACING, https://www.pepp-
pt.org. 
150 Ronald L. Rivest et al., The PACT Protocol Specification, PACT (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver-
0.1.pdf. 
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population in Germany downloaded the state-developed “Corona-Warn-App,” 
and only 4% of the population in France have downloaded the similar 
“StopCovid” app.155 It appears likely that digital contact tracing will not be a 
large factor in solving the coronavirus pandemic. However, with the launch of 
these apps, it is likely that the next major epidemic will involve digital contact 
tracing. Thus, it is important to understand how these apps function in this 
crisis, to better prepare for the next one. 
 
b. Centralized Digital Contact Tracing 
 
Centralized digital contact-tracing apps diverge from decentralized apps in 
relying on a central database or central authority for the contact-tracing data and 
process.156 For example, Singapore’s Trace Together app collects all data from 
individual devices in a national-government database157.  
 
Centralized contact-tracing app proposals have involved a variety of data 
sources, primarily Bluetooth data and cell-phone location data. For example, a 
Bluetooth-based decentralized app would infer proximity through anonymous 
key exchange device-to-device; but a Bluetooth-based centralized app could 
infer proximity through keys stored on a central database, with data collected 
from each device and results pushed back to devices.  
 
The chief privacy concern with centralized contact tracing is that these 
programs would enable governments to collect and use data as part of large-
scale surveillance, with few limits on what governments could do with the 
data.158 With centralized digital contact tracing, a central authority has control 
over all data that is collected, used, shared, and stored. There are few protections 
against misuse of data collected by these apps. Thus, the privacy of users of 
centralized contact-tracing apps depends on the trustworthiness of the central 
authority. 
 
However, as Helen Nissenbaum noted on Twitter, “there’s no loss of 
privacy as long as data is appropriately channeled. Trade off language sets up 
false dilemmas; we can enjoy gains without privacy casualties.”159 Using 
 
155 Gabriel Geiger, Europeans Aren’t Really Using COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, VICE (July 
21, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/akzne5/europeans-arent-really-using-covid-
19-contact-tracing-apps. 
156 Baobao Zhang et al., Americans’ Perceptions of Privacy and Surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
OSF PREPRINTS (May 13, 2020), osf.io/9wz3y. 
157 Baobao Zhang et al., Americans’ Perceptions of Privacy and Surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
OSF PREPRINTS (May 13, 2020), osf.io/9wz3y. 
158 Susan Landau, Christy E. Lopez & Laura Moy, The Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing, 
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Nissenbaum’s influential contextual integrity framework,160 we can certainly 
envision a scenario in which privacy rights are protected for the specific contexts 
raised by the contact-tracing process. In fact, some have argued that centralized 
contact-tracing apps may be more secure or privacy-protective, in that one 
central source stores all private information, making it potentially easier to 
govern the flows of data.  
 
c. Digital Contact Tracing’s Privacy Impact 
 
One issue with digital contact tracing apps, whether decentralized or 
centralized, is that they require a high percentage of the population to download 
and use the apps in order for the apps to actually be effective in tracing contacts 
and stopping or slowing the spread of disease.161 However, early research 
surveying public perception on various digital contact-tracing apps has revealed 
mixed results,162 suggesting that it may be difficult to convince some populations 
(e.g., certain nations or regions) to adopt the apps at a high enough rate to be 
efficacious. Indeed, as of July 2020, few if any nations that have rolled out 
voluntary apps have seen app adoption at rates necessary for effective contact 
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tracing.163 Some nations, like India,164 have gotten around this by mandating 
citizens download and use the app. 
 
Several scholars and advocates have expressed concerns about the privacy 
and civil-liberties harms contact-tracing apps might cause. Woodrow Hartzog 
noted that, although the Google and Apple proposal might be well-meaning, it 
would be difficult for the companies to police the use of app operators to ensure 
compliance.165 (This is not far-fetched. One need only look at the non-
compliance of app developers on the Google Play store or Apple app store, 
which has been a constant issue for many app platforms.166) Hartzog argues it 
would be simple for governments to abuse even the most privacy-preserving 
contact-tracing apps and, crucially, “this technology, once deployed, will not be 
‘rolled back.’”167  
 
Susan Landau et al. have also argued that contact-tracing apps may also 
create a false sense of security, leading some to recklessly put themselves at 
greater risk of exposure while relying on a potentially ineffective app.168 Contact-
tracing apps also raise equity concerns, as highlighted by Laundau et al., 
generating more false positives, with worse consequences.169 Additionally, if data 
collected through these apps is eventually used for other purposes, including law 
enforcement, this could have worse impact on some populations.170 Simko et al. 
have noted a number of privacy harms, including the potential for malicious 
actors to create intentional false positives, with negative consequences for 
people or businesses.171 
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Democracy, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020), 
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166 For example, the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal was caused by a rogue 
third-party app exceeding the terms. 
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168 Susan Landau, Christy E. Lopez & Laura Moy, The Importance of Equity in Contact Tracing, 
LAWFARE (May 1, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing. 
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4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions for Contact-Tracing Programs 
 
First, we must accept that we are wading in uncharted waters with digital 
contact-tracing applications launched at national or global scale. It is likely that 
we will not know what was the best solution until much later, with the precise 
view that only hindsight can provide. With that in mind, because the need is so 
dire, and the risks of not pushing forth with a full-fledged approach are 
hundreds of thousands to millions of deaths, there is no choice but to throw 
everything at the problem and see what sticks.172 Digital contact-tracing 
applications will not be enough (likely due to low user adoption), but they can 
theoretically help supplement or inform human contact tracing. If nothing else, 
it is helpful to evaluate their use in this pandemic to better prepare for the next 
global health crisis. 
 
If we are to use or even try digital contact tracing, it is key that policymakers 
and other authorities understand the technical details of these apps, particularly 
the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized digital contact-tracing 
proposals. This will require consultation with technical experts, as the relative 
dearth of technical experts embedded in government and policymaking roles is 
a longstanding problem.  
 
None of these applications can be perfectly precise and without flaws, 
including false positives (e.g., people whose devices were in close Bluetooth 
proximity but who were physically not with their devices, for example173) and 
false negatives174 (e.g., any single person not using the app). However, it appears 
that decentralized apps are likely the better choice, both because they are more 
privacy-preserving on a technical level and also because, due to the lack of 
consumer faith in government privacy protection, they are the better choice in 
terms of privacy perception and likely user adoption. 
 
Governments and other actors seeking to launch digital contact-tracing 
programs should encourage the use of decentralized contact-tracing apps that 
are interoperable at some level. Additionally, governments should pass laws that 
address the use of information collected during the contact-tracing process, 
including during human contact tracing, in order to protect the privacy of 
 
Preferences (May 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), .https://seclab.cs.washington.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/contact-tracing-user-privacy.pdf. 
172 Tiffany C. Li, Give All My Data to Google and the CDC, SLATE (Apr. 6, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/google-cdc-data-privacy-covid19.html. 
173 Ross Anderson, Contact Tracing in the Real World, LIGHT BLUE TOUCHPAPER (Apr. 12, 
2020), https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/04/12/contact-tracing-in-the-real-world. 
174 Susan Landau, Looking Beyond Contact Tracing to Stop the Spread, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2020, 
8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/looking-beyond-contact-tracing-stop-spread. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690004
 PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC 43 
individuals. At time of writing, a number of proposals have been raised in the 
United States. Regulatory agencies can also release guidance on privacy 
protections, both regarding enforceable mechanisms and best practices for 
contact-tracing programs. Similarly, those who build, implement, and run 
contact-tracing programs should also create and agree to industry standards, in 
line with what researchers have been doing with interoperability standards for 
decentralized contact-tracing applications. Publicizing privacy protections may 
aid in restoring user trust, which may then help increase use of contact-tracing 
programs, digital or not. 
 
D.  Novel Technologies in Healthcare 
 
The pandemic has already changed healthcare, with effects that may last long 
after the world recovers. For example, there has been great growth in 
telemedicine and telehealth services, as many healthcare providers have closed 
their offices or limited in-person visits.175 The pandemic has brought some 
medical uses of technology to the forefront, including telehealth and 
telemedicine, use of medical AI in diagnostics and research, and the use of 
patient-facing devices and care robots in healthcare settings.  
 
At the same time, the unique dimensions of the pandemic have changed the 
use of technology in medicine. The public-health emergency has created the 
sudden need for a large medical and healthcare workforce, both in direct 
response to patients in relation to COVID-19 and associated medical issues, as 
well as to replace healthcare workers who may be indisposed due to exposure 
to the virus or becoming ill themselves. The extremely contagious nature of the 
virus has also made it difficult to treat patients, necessitating a limitation on 
physical contact between patients and healthcare professionals as well as the 
friends and family who would otherwise be visiting. Additionally, different 
groups of people may be facing disparate health struggles, including exacerbated 
issues of bias in medical care.176 
 
1. Telehealth and Telemedicine 
 
Two unique factors of this pandemic have led to a rise in telehealth, 
telemedicine, and teletherapy services. First, the novel coronavirus is highly 
 
175 Kathleen T. Jordan, An Unexpected Benefit of the Pandemic: The Doctor Will Virtually See You 
Now, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020, 9:17 AM EDT), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/14/telemedicine-virtual-health-
coronavirus. 
176 John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch, Questions of Bias in Covid-19 Treatment Add to the 
Mourning for Black Families, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2020), 
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contagious, necessitating social distancing. Traditional physical locations where 
healthcare is provided have been shut down, and in-person house calls raise 
concerns regarding contagion as well. Second, the failures in the health systems 
of many nations in being able to meet medical needs of both COVID-19 
sufferers and others during this time have led to a need for more medical 
services. Thus, in a time when more medical services are needed, and yet medical 
service providers cannot physically be near patients, telehealth has become an 
important part of healthcare across the world. 
 
Regulators have recognized this need, relaxing some HIPAA restrictions to 
allow for more medical providers to more easily offer telehealth services to 
patients in need.177 It is possible that these relaxations of HIPAA may pave the 
way for future loosening of HIPAA and related restrictions on transmission and 
storage of health information. Telehealth has been beneficial to many, 
improving access to healthcare for people in rural areas,178 low-income 
populations, disabled people, and more. However, the increased use of 
telehealth may disadvantage people without access to stable or strong internet 
or computer or mobile devices.  
 
What is interesting is not telehealth itself, or HIPAA, but rather the speed 
at which HHS was willing to bend HIPAA rules in a state of public-health 
emergency. This speaks to the malleability of HIPPA protections—and health-
privacy protections in the United States generally. While the pandemic may have 
been a good reason to loosen these regulations, one must wonder if the 
regulations so easily loosened should be restructured overall to better fit future 
 
177 COVID-19 & HIPAA Bulletin: Limited Waiver of HIPAA Sanctions and Penalties During a 
Nationwide Public 
Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2020), 
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Rights, COVID-19 and HIPAA: Disclosures to Law Enforcement, Paramedics, Other First Responders 
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https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf; Office 
of Civil Rights, Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEPT. 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr-
bulletin-3-28-20.pdf; Office of Civil Rights, FAQs on Telehealth and HIPAA During the COVID-
19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/telehealth-faqs-508.pdf.HHS 
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crises. Perhaps, health-privacy regulations should allow for emergency response 
and for technological innovation when needed, while still protecting patient 
privacy. If the current regulatory scheme for health privacy does not adequately 
protect Americans in a public-health crisis, the law must resolve this 
discrepancy. 
 
2. Medical AI for Research, Diagnostics, and Triage 
 
Artificial intelligence and machine-learning tools have also been key 
components of the medical and scientific response to the pandemic. Artificial 
intelligence describes any form of machine intelligence designed to mimic the 
functionality of human intelligence. Machine learning is a process by which a 
machine is fed a quantity of data, from which it extrapolates certain predictions 
based on that data.179  
 
AI is being used in medical research, to search for treatments and vaccines 
for the novel coronavirus. For example, researchers have adapted or 
implemented existing AI technology for use in medical triage for COVID-19 
patients. Researchers in China and the United States reportedly developed an 
AI-backed tool to predict which newly infected patients would likely later 
develop acute respiratory disease syndrome (ARDS), a severe lung disease that 
kills fifty percent of patients. The idea was that this tool could then be used by 
hospitals running low on resources to triage their patients—e.g., giving 
ventilators to patients less likely to develop ARDS (and thus more likely to 
survive the infection).180 Another AI system designed to help hospitals triage 
patients is eCART, a system used by the University of Chicago Medical Center, 
to predict which patients will have worse medical outcomes (e.g., which patients 
will need intubations).181 A Stanford team lead by Ron Li is also evaluating an 
automated “Deterioration Index” to identify patients whose medical conditions 
will likely deteriorate.182  
 
These AI-enabled tools may be useful in aiding medical staff, potentially 
saving time and resources. They may also lift some of the burdens from 
physicians and other healthcare workers who would otherwise have to make 
 
179 MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE (2018).) 
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(Apr. 17, 2020), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/artificial-intelligence/medical-ai/ai-
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difficult decisions on their own that would take time from their other clinical 
duties. One of the most tragic phenomena of this pandemic has been that the 
lack of medical resources has pushed doctors to triage lifesaving equipment, 
making decisions on who lives or dies.183 It is possible that having an AI-enabled 
tool to back up a doctor’s decision could alleviate some of the burden of this 
ethical quagmire. Medical AI tools may be able to save time and resources for 
health professionals, which could mean saving lives when in a public-health 
crisis. However, the use of AI in medical triage is fraught with ethical issues, 
including concerns raised by disability advocates that people with disabilities 
may be at higher risk of death due to triage plans prioritizing people without 
disabilities.184 
 
AI systems should be designed with privacy interests in mind. For example, 
if patient data is used to train a machine learning algorithm on predicting which 
patients may develop which symptoms, it is necessary that the patient data is 
deidentified or collected in a non-identifiable manner. The use of patient data, 
potentially including photographs (e.g., X-ray scans of lungs to analyze COVID-
related damage185), also comes with privacy risks. Re-identification of data is 
always a risk, as well as misuse of patient data. Patients may not realize how their 
data is used, and, while proper informed consent is necessary before collecting 
patient data for use in these systems, it may be difficult to gain adequate consent 
for difficult-to-understand tools and data usage, particularly in emergency 
settings. While regulations like the 21st Century Cures Act may protect patient 
information used in federal research, some AI systems are built by private 
institutions,186 with fewer regulations on the collection and use of data. 
Additionally, the critical emergency nature of an active global pandemic may 
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necessitate a relaxing of some privacy-based restrictions on use of data, 
including in AI systems.  
 
These AI-based tools are not without their drawbacks. Many scholars have 
highlighted problems with bias187 that creep into the design and implementation 
of many AI systems. Medical AI systems also suffer from this problem,188 and 
the consequences can be literal life or death for patients.189 While it is 
understandable that healthcare providers in the middle of a public-health 
emergency turn to any tools that can help them maximize their time and 
resources and help save more lives, it is troubling that some of these tools may 
not have been designed with fairness and equality in mind.  
 
Privacy is an important dimension of the algorithmic-discrimination 
problem. Some privacy-protective measures may actually make algorithmic 
discrimination worse. For example, by stripping data of some identifying 
characteristics (like race, gender, and so on), system designers may unknowingly 
use biased data or data that is not reflective of their target population. This may 
also make it more difficult to audit the algorithms afterward, to analyze if 
algorithmic discrimination occurred. It is also possible that privacy laws and 
regulations may limit the data available to researchers and designers of AI 
systems.  
 
Algorithmic discrimination can happen at different points in an AI systems, 
including in the designed goals of the system, the selection of training data, the 
choice of parameters, and more.190 For example, an AI-based tool that predicts 
the likelihood a COVID-19 patient will survive intubation could rely on past 
data of patients that have had the virus and either did end up surviving 
 
187 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
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intubation or didn’t. However, the data set of patient outcomes might not 
include confounding factors, including race, gender, socioeconomic class, and 
more. The dataset may reflect biases.  
 
For example, consider a hospital that decides to use an AI triage system that 
predicts patient survival based on a data set of past patients and intubation 
survival rates. The hospital uses this system to decide which patients are given 
priority when allocating ventilators. A system based on past survival data may 
seem unbiased and neutral. However, there are a number of ways bias could 
creep in. Perhaps patients living in low-income areas tended to also suffer from 
lack of access to consistent healthcare and nutrition, leading to worse health 
outcomes when hospitalized. The predictive algorithm, then, might predict 
outcomes that reflect those biases, predicting that low-income patients would 
be less likely to survive intubation. This would create what many would agree 
would be a discriminatory outcome: the AI tool would suggest 
disproportionately that low-income patients should not be prioritized. A 
hospital using this system would then unintentionally prioritize wealthier 
patients, leading to a death disparity.  
 
Of course, human healthcare providers may also not be without their own 
biases. Studies have shown that some groups suffer worse outcomes than 
others, due possibly to the bias of healthcare workers.191 For example, a review 
of pain management in hospitals found that Black and Hispanic patients were 
less likely to receive pain-relieving analgesia for the management of acute pain, 
implying that healthcare providers had made decisions based on patients’ race 
and not on the patients’ actual need for pain relief.192 Bias may also be playing a 
role in creating disproportionate medical consequences for some communities 
in the pandemic.193 
 
The law has not comprehensively addressed the risks of medical AI.194 While 
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medical AI tools can be useful in a public-health emergency like the coronavirus 
pandemic, the law must balance protection of patient privacy and algorithmic 
rights versus the need for researchers and healthcare providers to act and 
innovate nimbly in times of crisis.  
 
3. Healthcare Robots 
 
One of the myriad difficulties of healthcare in the middle of a highly 
contagious viral epidemic is the need to isolate patients from each other, from 
healthcare professionals, and from their family and friends. Some hospitals have 
also turned to robots195 to assist, especially where it would be difficult or costly 
to have humans performing the same tasks.196 For example, robots have been 
used in hospitals around the world to remotely take temperature readings,197 a 
task that would otherwise require a human healthcare provider to get in close 
physical proximity to the patient. While the coronavirus pandemic created new 
needs for robots deployed in healthcare settings, robots have been frequently 
deployed in other disaster and emergency settings.198 Robots can be helpful in 
emergency situations where a human presence would be dangerous or 
inefficient, including in healthcare emergencies where human proximity is a 
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potential vector for deadly viruses. 
 
Robotics scholar Robin R. Murphy and the Robotics for Infectious Diseases 
team she chairs have been tracking the way robots have been used during the 
COVID-19 response worldwide.199 As of April 2020, Murphy’s team has 
reported many reported uses of robots in healthcare settings or functions as part 
of COVID-19 response. These uses have included: disinfecting physical spaces 
(e.g., clinics and hospitals); telepresence abilities for healthcare workers (e.g., 
allowing a nurse to check on patient symptoms virtually); patient intake and 
visitors; patient and family socializing; delivery and dispensing of food, 
prescriptions, or other items; as well as testing (e.g., temperature scans).200 As 
Murphy and her colleagues predict, the use of robots in COVID-19 response 
may lead to an increased use of robots in healthcare or other settings, as well as 
the development of new robots.201  
 
The use of robots in healthcare settings for pandemic response raises 
interesting legal questions. Ryan Calo has written extensively on the 
“exceptional” nature of robots and the necessity for transforming laws to adapt 
to the needs of regulating robots,202 including in the realm of privacy law.203 Calo 
notes three unique characteristics of robots that will require transformations in 
law: embodiment (i.e., physical presence), emergence (e.g., the potential for 
autonomous, independent action), and social valence (here, the idea that robots 
“feel different to us, more like living agents”).204 Other scholars have also noted 
the distinctive privacy-regulation challenges stemming from these factors.205 
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While truly autonomous robots that are capable of acting without a “human 
in the loop” are still a long way off, the physical embodiment of robots in 
healthcare settings and in emergency response creates interesting challenges for 
regulating these uses of robots. The types of robots used in healthcare and 
emergency response contexts are, as Eduard Fosch Villaronga puts it, “complex 
cyber-physical systems.”206 To regulate their use, the law must address the 
privacy implications of both digital data collection and use as well as the privacy 
harms specifically created by the physical presence of robots, their movements, 
and their physical functions. As Lutz et al. describe, “[t]he dimension of physical 
privacy is affected by the physical nature and mobility of social robots, while 
social robots’ data collection and processing capacities affect users’ informational 
privacy.”207 While technologies like medical AI and telemedicine platforms may 
affect a person’s informational privacy, healthcare robots used in pandemic 
response may affect both informational privacy and physical privacy.  
 
Additionally, the privacy impacts of robots will be influenced by the social 
valence of robots and our natural inclination to anthropomorphize certain 
robots, ascribing to them characteristics and perhaps legal protections we 
ordinarily would give to human beings.208 Many healthcare robots would likely 
be designed as social robots, a category Kate Darling has defined as a robot that 
is a “physically embodied, autonomous agent that communications and interacts 
with humans on a social level,”209 often “communicat[ing] through social cues, 
display[ing] adaptive learning behavior, and mimic[ing] various emotional 
states.”210 Humans often display empathy toward social robots. One study 
showed that humans were more likely to hesitate to strike a robot if the robot 
had first been given a lifelike story, suggesting that stories may influence the 
empathic responses of humans to robots.211 In a healthcare setting, particularly 
in a dire emergency healthcare setting, humans may quickly link certain robots 
with emotional stories or characteristics. For example, a healthcare robot that 
regularly delivers pain-relieving medication to a coronavirus patient may become 
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associated with positive thoughts.  
 
Both the emotionally intensive experience of being in a critical healthcare 
space (for patients, loved ones, and healthcare workers) as well as the 
emotionally intensive experience of living through a global pandemic may 
contribute to healthcare robots being associated with emotions, stories, or other 
human-like characteristics. This increased anthropomorphization of healthcare 
robots in a pandemic may have impacts on privacy, as would the increased 
emotional connections people may develop with the robots that function in this 
space and time. For example, it’s possible people may experience greater privacy 
loss, viewing the robot’s intrusions (physical or otherwise) as similar to that of a 
human’s. It is also possible that individuals voluntarily give more data to robots 
(for example, answering questions about symptoms), based on feeling an 
emotional or quasi-human connection. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
individuals feel less privacy impact, particularly if, as some believe, privacy is 
most importantly considered a right to be let alone from the eyes of other 
humans.212 
 
Protecting the privacy rights of individuals dealing with healthcare robots 
during a pandemic can be difficult, as many individuals do not understand how 
robots work in practice and how the use of any particular robot may impact 
their privacy.213 In fact, some have argued that notice and consent is not possible 
with many types of robots used in healthcare, given the lack of information, 
amount of new knowledge needed for many users, and the resulting difficulty 
of obtaining truly informed consent.214 
 
People who are ill may have less ability to advocate for themselves and 
protect themselves from privacy violations due to the use of robots. Studies 
have shown that women, people of color, disabled people, and other people 
from marginalized backgrounds already suffer disproportionately negative 
outcomes in healthcare, including simply not having their cares addressed by 
healthcare workers.215 These people may be less able to advocate for themselves 
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if they view the use of robots to be intrusive. (Though it is also possible that 
healthcare robots may actually create greater equity in healthcare, depending on 
one’s perception of the comparative biases of robots and humans in providing 
equal care.) An additional dimension of healthcare in pandemic is the isolated 
nature of patients, who are unable to have friends or family visit them and act 
as patient advocates. If a coronavirus patient cannot muster the strength to ask 
for a robot to be removed, there may be no one around them who can advocate 
for them.  
 
The privacy of people dealing with healthcare robots is particularly 
important in an emotionally fraught time like a pandemic, especially in situations 
where human lives are on the line. The physical presence of a robot may feel 
more intrusive to someone in a heightened emotional state, or possibly, the 
presence of a robot may be welcome, given the lack of other human contact. A 
person’s expectation of and understanding of privacy in relation to robots will 
likely change in this time and setting. 
 
While it may be tempting to argue for laws regulating the use of robots, as a 
category, the very different types of robots that are currently used and the 
different settings in which they are used require specific regulation. Particularly 
in sensitive contexts like healthcare, regulation of robots must happen in specific 
forms, with attention paid to each particular sector and type of use.216 
 
II. TECH AND PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC 
 
The COVID-19 virus is fast-moving, highly contagious, deadly, and often 
invisible. These factors have led to increased use of technologies allowing for 
the replacement of some in-person human contact in government and corporate 
functions. Additionally, the need to protect against the spread of the disease has 
led to increased use of technologies, sometimes in novel ways. Finally, social 
isolation and the shutdowns of many public and private spaces has led to an 
increased use of technologies allowing people to connect to each other, socially 
as well as for employment and education. 
 
Government surveillance, be it for national security, intelligence, law 
enforcement, or pandemic response purposes, is important to understand and 
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important to limit, in the interest of protecting individual freedom from 
government overreach. However, in the age of surveillance capitalism,217 
surveillance by other actors has emerged as an equally important phenomenon 
to study for privacy impacts. While employers, consumer-facing corporations, 
and education providers have used technology in different ways during the 
pandemic, it can be useful to understand this class of surveillance as distinct 
from government surveillance conducted under traditional surveillance powers 
and through traditional surveillance means. The following is a non-exhaustive 
exploration of different ways the pandemic has changed privacy and technology 
in these sectors: government, employment, education, and consumer 
technology. 
 
A.  Government Surveillance 
 
Governments worldwide have proposed different surveillance initiatives 
dedicated to pandemic response. These include testing and contact tracing, the 
use of new technologies, like facial recognition and drones, as well as increased 
video and other forms of surveillance (including to enforce such measures as 
social distancing and mask wearing218). The privacy risks of facial recognition 
and drones219 have been much studied, as has been the rise of government 
surveillance generally and correspondent harms to privacy. Robots have also 
been deployed as part of government COVID-19 response, including for 
monitoring, crowd dispersal, enforcing social distancing, identifying infected 
people, and giving public information.220 
 
The technologies are not new. (For example, one could easily draw a line 
between the use of heat-sensing surveillance in Kyllo v. United States221 to the use 
of heat-sensing robots in COVID-19 surveillance today.222) What has changed 
is the use of the public-health rationale behind deploying these technologies at 
a greater scale, and in more intrusive fashion. Government surveillance has used 
technological tools, but this is perhaps the first time many of these tools have 
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been used at a large scale, specifically for the stated purpose of protecting public 
health. 
 
Public health as rationale for privacy invasion is relatively new for many of 
the technologies under discussion, though public safety has long been a fallback 
excuse for any number of civil-liberties violations. Public health has also been 
used as an excuse for violating privacy and civil rights in the past, including the 
institutionalization of Mary Mallon, a poor woman believed to have infected 
dozens of people with typhoid fever, including after she was publicly sanctioned 
against doing so.223 Mallon, an asymptomatic typhoid carrier, was forcibly 
quarantined twice and repeatedly subjected to unwanted medical tests. She 
became the subject of public ridicule and died alone in forced isolation. Public 
health can be an excuse governments use for any number of wrongs, and laws 
should take care to prevent such harms. What is different now is specifically the 
use of the public-health rationale for government surveillance using data-driven, 
connected, and autonomous technologies. 
 
It is important to note that the privacy-invasive programs that have been 
used elsewhere have also been used as pandemic response, with public health 
taking the place of other purposes, like public safety, controlling extremism, and 
so on. For example, U.S. government agencies have considered or have adopted 
contracts with Clearview AI224 and Palantir225 for pandemic response. Clearview 
AI is the embattled facial-recognition company that scraped millions of 
photographs from social media to develop a shadowy facial-recognition system 
it then sold to both governments and corporations,226 potentially including 
countries like Saudi Arabia that are not particularly known for protecting human 
rights.227 Previously, law-enforcement agencies across America had been relying 
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on public safety and criminal justice as the primary rationales for implementing 
facial-recognition surveillance, as well as related technological developments, 
like drones, robots, and algorithmic processing.228 Many of these surveillance 
tactics are not new, but the new and increased uses of government surveillance 
during the pandemic merits attention. 
 
Government surveillance in a pandemic raises interesting concerns for 
privacy. First, future privacy legislation should take note of the public-health 
rationale for privacy-invasive technologies and protect against abuse of that 
moral justification. Second, more attention should be paid to the portability of 
data collected for one crisis response and used in another. Or, more generally, 
the law should address the current lack of strict purpose limitation in collection 
of data and transfer to, access by, and use by government.  
 
Further, potentially invasive programs should be undertaken only if they can 
be developed in privacy-preserving ways, and only if they can be shown to be 
actually effective from a practical, technical standpoint. It is too easy to allow 
for unchecked use of surveillance technologies that have no link to actual 
improvements in public health, leading to both a degradation in privacy and 
civil-liberties norms as well as a loss of faith on the part of the public in their 
governmental institutions. 
 
Finally, it is likely that future crises will allow governments to exploit public 
health, public safety, or other rationales to justify increasing amounts of 
surveillance and use of privacy-invasive technologies.229 It will be difficult to 
limit the onward sharing and downstream harms of data collected during these 
crises. Thus, future privacy legislation should create protections for 
downstream, distributed harms. This could include shifting to a data-protection 
framework, with rights including the right to request deletion, as well as 
algorithmic-accountability rights, including the right to contest results of an 
algorithmically derived decision. Additionally, the law must solve for the 
compound privacy harms raised by data aggregators, as we have seen 
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B.  Employer Surveillance 
 
Similar to what we have seen with government surveillance, the technology 
used in corporate-employer surveillance is mostly not entirely novel or 
constructed out of whole cloth for the pandemic. Employers have used new 
technologies to track their employees in many forms for years,230 and scholars 
have called for greater protections of employee privacy, particularly in the time 
of digital technologies that make surveillance simple.231 However, what has 
changed are: (1) the scale at which employers have used these technologies to 
track employees; and (2) the use of a public-health rationale to justify employee 
monitoring.  
 
1. Remote Work Surveillance 
 
One of the most widely practiced methods of pandemic response has been 
for governments to encourage their residents to practice social distancing, while 
shutting down many businesses and public and private spaces. Social distancing 
in this context describes measures taken to maintain physical distance between 
humans, with the goal of preventing spread of disease.232 Many states and 
municipalities in the United States enforced orders that shut down non-essential 
businesses, defined differently in each location.  
 
For many white-collar workers, the pandemic has resulted in a switch to 
working from home, using remote technologies. An early MIT study found that 
an estimated 34.1% of Americans were working remotely from home by early 
April 2020.233 Work from home has been a form of pandemic response. For 
example, one factor possibly aiding Seattle’s public-health response was early 
partnership with local technology companies in shifting much of their workforce 
to remote.234 In contrast, some workplaces have remained open and functioning, 
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utilizing new privacy-invasive programs in a purported attempt to safeguard 
employees and consumers from the virus.  
 
Workers working from home have relied on technologies, including 
distributed work software and services like Microsoft SharePoint and Dropbox. 
Many of these technologies come with their own privacy risks, from the ever-
present risk of data breach to the risks of companies selling or sharing behavioral 
and user data to data brokers or other parties for use in marketing or other 
purposes users would not appreciate.  
 
Additionally, some employers have implemented privacy-invasive software 
choices, including requiring employees to keep cameras on through all working 
hours,235 as well as using software that tracks every single thing employees are 
doing on their computers during the workday (including browser search terms 
and email text).236 Companies that provide employee-monitoring services, 
including ActivTrak, Time Doctor, Hubstaff, Interguard, and Teramind, 
reported huge increases in customer base and revenue, as told to the Washington 
Post.237 Some have called this range of technologies “tattleware.”238  
 
In lieu of in-person meetings, many have turned to using teleconferencing 
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Hangout240, WebEx241, and more.242 Many of these technologies came with their 
own privacy problems. Zoom in particular gained an early lead as the 
videoconferencing software of choice for many, leading to increased scrutiny 
from privacy and security advocates and researchers243 , as well as legal and 
regulatory inquiry.244 While these companies should have done better in terms 
of privacy, it is to some extent understandable why they failed. As a matter of 
scale, it is likely these companies were not prepared to deal with a sudden large-
scale increase in users as well as a shift in their user base, from primarily 
enterprise users to the general public at large. However, regardless of reason, 
many of these companies failed to properly protect the privacy and security of 
their users, at least in the beginning of the pandemic and the large shift to work 
from home. 
 
The increase use of remote working technology has also increased potential 
for abuse of technologies. In the unfortunate #PoorJennifer case, a person was 
recorded on a group Zoom chat and filmed taking their laptop into the restroom 
with them – and then using the toilet, while still unknowingly on camera. 245 This 
video was then shared on social media, without anonymization of names on the 
call, likely to significant harm for the individual pictured. On a more minor level, 
increased use of videoconferencing technology means that many will 
unknowingly expose information about themselves, e.g., through items in the 
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backgrounds of their home videos, or the potentially location-identifying views 
through their home windows. The increased use of remote working 
technologies that include photo, audio, or video also create greater content 
moderation, speech regulation, and online harassment concerns for tech 
platforms.246 
 
On a theoretical level, some amount of privacy is lost when the social norm 
is for individuals to open up their private homes to view for others in a work 
context. This represents a fundamental shift in our understanding of public and 
private spaces,247 as the office has traditionally been a semi-public space, while 
the home is among our most private of places.248 The shift to remote work, aided 
by omnipresent monitoring and the use of video chat software, has eroded the 
line between office and home and changed the way people present themselves 
in these contexts. This shift in contextual understanding249 may change the way 
we understand privacy in both work and home contexts even past the pandemic. 
As society’s reasonable expectations of privacy shift, so too will our legal 
interpretation of such understandings and how the law should regulate 
technology and privacy. 
 
2. In-Person Corporate Surveillance 
 
For workers not privileged enough to work safely indoors during the 
pandemic, a mess of privacy problems have arisen during the pandemic. Even 
as the pandemic subsides, some of these in-person surveillance measures may 
continue, at least for a period of time. For example, we may see temperature 
checks or COVID-19 testing enforcement for employees as businesses return 
to physical office spaces. 
 
Companies have used digital technologies to surveil employees in-person for 
many years.250 For example, Amazon has been tracking employee movement 
through mandatory digital connected wristbands since at least 2014.251 In 
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response to pandemic concerns, companies have also rolled out similar 
wearables to track employees and enforce social distancing in the workplace.252 
 
Factories and warehouses have become hot spots for infection and viral 
transmission.253  In response, many corporations have instituted privacy-invasive 
programs in an attempt to ensure the safety of their workers, products, and 
consumers. Some have required temperature testing before entering the 
workspace, surveys asking employees for symptoms, and contact tracing for any 
infected employees. In April 2020, the EEOC released new guidance on 
employer responsibilities concerning COVID-19 and ADA protections, 
suggesting that employers should be allowed to “administer COVID-19 testing 
to employees before they enter the workplace to determine if they have the 
virus.”254 While some employers may have also considered the use of antibody 
tests or immunity passports, neither type of program has emerged as a leading 
trend yet.  
 
3. Digital Inequities 
 
It is also important to note the disparate impact of digital employee 
surveillance on different groups. For example, women may face more negative 
consequences from abuse of their photos or video content recorded in remote 
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explicit personal content, in particular, may have worse consequences for 
women.256 This may be more likely to occur with greater use of remote work 
technologies. (Home computing devices and remote devices are likely less 
secure than devices routinely maintained and updated on secure office networks 
in the workplace.) Women, people of color, LGBT people, and other people 
from marginalized groups also may face greater harassment through remote 
work technologies, as they often face greater online harassment through 
communication platforms.257 People from marginalized groups already face 
discrimination in the workplace,258 so they may be less able to fight back against 
encroaching employer privacy invasions as well.  
 
While white-collar workers may face digital surveillance through remote 
work, it is possible that some of these surveillance methods will decrease when 
workers return to the office. However, workers in different settings, including 
factories and warehouses, are unlikely to see a change, as they will continue to 
work in the same settings pre- and post-pandemic. These workers are also likely 
to have less power in fighting back against employer surveillance. Many of the 
people doing these jobs belong to lower income, lower education, rural, 
formerly incarcerated, or other marginalized groups in society. Low-income 
workers, contract workers, and gig-economy workers often have to face greater 
privacy violations in the course of business, with less power to fight against 
employer abuses. Effectively, pandemic-driven employer surveillance may 
create even greater inequalities in employee privacy, with higher-income and 
white-collar workers suffering fewer privacy harms for potentially shorter time 
periods.  
 
Not only will people from already marginalized segments of society face 
greater privacy harms related to technology uses by employers in public-health 
emergency, but these privacy and labor harms are compounded in complex ways 
for those who face discrimination and disparate impacts due to more than one 
of their identities, creating intersectional privacy harms that are often not 
considered in privacy laws. Additionally, increased corporate surveillance, while 
worrisome for employees, may also be harmful for corporations. Individuals 
need privacy to be able to innovate,259 to produce the creative insights and work 
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that corporations need to be economically successful. 
 
Gig-economy workers will also face disparate harms, as most are considered 
independent contractors, without the benefits and protections given to 
employees.260 The drastic fall in the economy has caused millions of Americans 
to lose their jobs or face cuts in job hours,261 perhaps leading some to venture 
into gig-economy positions that may still be functioning as “essential” work. 
Instacart, a gig-economy platform that connects consumers with workers who 
shop and then deliver groceries and other items from stores, saw an explosion 
in their workforce and profits. In early May 2020, the company announced that 
it had recruited 300,000 new workers in a month, with plans to hire 250,000, at 
the same time that the company also announced it had hit its sales goals through 
2022.262  
 
Gig-economy or sharing companies like Instacart often already operated on 
an information asymmetry, profiting from the data gathered on consumers and 
gig-economy workers alike, with their independent-contractor workers unable 
to fight against privacy invasions.263 Gig-economy workers already have few 
privacy protections and are often subject to surveillance and data collection and 
tracking from companies. Many gig-economy workers are uniquely vulnerable, 
as they often have difficulty finding other employment,264 so they have less 
ability to fight against corporate privacy invasions. These privacy harms likely 
were exacerbated or at least continued at a greater scale during the pandemic. 
There is little incentive for these companies to increase privacy protections, 
particularly as they are not treating gig-economy workers as employees but 
rather as independent contractors. Gig-economy workers often also face some 
of the same vulnerabilities as blue collar workers, and depending on the job, the 
groups often intersect, creating intersectional harms that multiply for workers 
who experience overlapping forms of vulnerability in the workplace. 
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4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Employee Privacy 
 
With employer surveillance as with government surveillance, we have not 
necessarily seen new technologies develop in reaction to pandemic needs. 
Rather, what has happened is a change in scale and rationale: greater use of 
existing technologies for digital surveillance; and a new justification for use of 
these privacy-invasive technologies. (A similar phenomenon has occurred with 
government surveillance, as discussed previously.) Before the pandemic, digital 
employee surveillance was often justified for economic and efficiency reasons.265 
Now, during the pandemic, employers are justifying digital surveillance for 
reasons related to public health (including the social health benefits of keeping 
remote coworkers connected266). 
 
Scholars have called for greater legal protections for employees against 
corporate surveillance. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Jason Schultz, and Kate Crawford 
proposed three solutions: (1) an omnibus federal information-privacy law that 
would include employee protections; (2) a sector-specific Employee Privacy 
Protection Act; or (3) a more limited sector-specific and context-specific 
Employee Health Information Privacy Act.267 For Ajunwa et al., “the protection 
of workers’ privacy is a civil rights issue: both for the protection of human 
dignity rights and because privacy invasions can serve as vehicles for unlawful 
discrimination.”268 Employee health information is particularly important to 
protect in the midst of a public-health emergency, but generally, the privacy 
rights of employees are something the law should take pains to protect, given 
the power asymmetry between employers and employees. 
 
It appears likely that employer surveillance will continue. If anything, the 
rise in employer surveillance during this pandemic will likely raise the floor for 
employer surveillance after the pandemic is over. Thus, it will become even 
more important for the law to protect employees. Lawmakers in the United 
States should include specific employee-centric provisions in future national 
privacy regulation. Additionally, laws like HIPAA and GINA can be amended 
to strengthen protections employees have against employer collection, use, and 
sharing of their health and genetic data. 
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While many advocates have called for greater privacy protections of 
employees, employers now have new justification for digital surveillance 
programs. With the public-health crisis still in full swing, it is likely that public-
health rationales will prove persuasive, allowing employers to expand 
surveillance programs. Even after the pandemic subsides, these changes in 
employment-surveillance norms will likely have long-term effects. Norms will 
shift, and societal expectations of privacy will shift, paving the way for even 
more employee surveillance in the future. 
 
C.  Education Privacy in Pandemic 
 
In response to the pandemic, both public and private schools in many states 
and municipalities have shut down, including K-12 schools as well as higher-
education settings. In early March, ABC News estimated more than 290 million 
students worldwide have had school disrupted due to COVID-19.269 As schools 
have closed physical, in-person spaces, many have shifted to remote, online 
teaching. With that shift has come a natural change in relationships with privacy 
and technology, on the part of students, parents and guardians of younger 
students, educators, and education institutions. 
 
Student privacy has long been an issue in an era of digital learning and 
connected tools. From the ill-fated One Laptop per Child program,270 to positive 
uses of technology in the physical classroom, to innovative online-learning 
developments, technology has changed the way education is done in our society. 
Changes in society have also changed education technology. For example, the 
rise of wireless and broadband access to the internet, as well as the increased 
access to mobile devices, has allowed for education services to proliferate online, 
including educators teaching through YouTube, apps like Khan Academy and 
Duolingo, and the phenomenon of massive open online courses (MOOCs) and 
other “virtual learning environments,”271 as well as free, open-knowledge 
resources like Wikipedia. All of these new technological innovations come with 
their own privacy issues. Additionally, many students have faced a loss of 
physical education privacy, as many have been forced to move home or stay 
home, losing the physical privacy a school or library may have provided.  
 
The primary laws protecting student privacy in the United States include the 
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Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which protects children’s 
online privacy, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 
which protects student records held by public institutions. These laws generally 
target privacy protection to specifically protect the privacy of a class of users 
(children), a type of data (student records), or a setting (public educational 
institutions). However, these and other privacy laws do not protect a broader 
conception of educational privacy, which includes protection of the physical or 
virtual space272 necessary for students and educators to freely engage in the 
pursuit of knowledge. 
 
Julie E. Cohen has argued for privacy as a right that protects the ability for 
individuals to creatively explore and create their identities.273 Neil Richards has 
identified the right to intellectual privacy, the privacy necessary to safeguard our 
intellectual thoughts and develop new ideas freely.274 Ari Ezra Waldman has 
called for privacy law to protect “safe social spaces” in which “environments of 
information exchange in which disclosure norms are counterbalanced by norms 
of trust backed endogenously by design and exogenously by law.”275 Building on 
these concepts, we ought to understand educational privacy as a distinct privacy 
right that safeguards the ability for a student to safely explore ideas and 
knowledge, to develop their intellectual selves and their personal selves, as well 
as the ability for educators and researchers to facilitate and participate in 
intellectual endeavors in the education context. This educational privacy right 
should be linked to the essential purpose for education to provide social space 
for students to learn and grow through learning, for educators to impart 
knowledge and foster intellectual growth, and for researchers to produce and 
disseminate knowledge. 
 
During the pandemic, privacy issues with remote learning technologies and 
innovations have only increased,276 as more students and learners are pushed to 
take learning from the physical to digital realm. Students have lost much of their 
educational privacy interests, harms sometimes aided and sometimes 
ameliorated by use of technologies. 
 
1. Education Technology 
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Shifting education to remote, online spaces has led to an explosion in the 
use of education-surveillance technology, including software installed on school-
sanctioned devices that can track the activity of students using the device. This 
category of privacy-violating technology also includes exam-proctoring 
software,277 like Proctorio, a program which uses facial-detection software to 
monitor students taking an exam online, by tracking eye movements, 
background activity, and noise—all through access to the student’s camera and 
microphone.278 These programs can collect many forms of data from students, 
including photos, video recordings of students at their computers, voice data, 
browsing history, keystroke data, and more.279 
 
The increased use and reliance on digital-education technology tools has 
raised concerns for privacy. Many of these programs have come under fire in 
the early phases of the pandemic for a wide variety of privacy and security 
concerns. Zoom, a remote videoconferencing application, found itself the 
subject of investigation by the New York Attorney General’s Office for privacy 
concerns,280 and the city of New York temporarily stopped use of Zoom for all 
public schools.281 Some of the privacy harms from this shift to online learning 
could be ameliorated by focusing more attention to asynchronous learning as 
opposed to live sessions where students must log in and potentially have video 
and audio on. Asynchronous learning could also aid in lessening unequal access 
to education in times of public-health crisis and the effects of the digital 
divide.282 
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Additionally, using digital platforms for learning comes with potential for 
harassment and abuse. Early in the pandemic, the phenomenon known as 
“Zoombombing” began occurring, as people started to use Zoom as a venue 
for harassment and disruption.283 A Connecticut teen was charged with 
computer crime for Zoombombing—in this case, entering a high school’s 
online classes and disrupting the class with obscene language and hand 
gestures.284 Harmful activity on Zoom and other online video-conferencing 
platforms reached a bad enough threshold that the FBI released an article285 on 
guidance for defending against these attacks, and the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) also 
published guidance on this issue.286 
 
These education technologies are not new, but the scale at which they are 
being used is new, as most schools around the world have shut down physical 
campuses. It is possible that more schools will rely on distance education in the 
future, perhaps due to familiarity gained during the pandemic. As such, these 
technologies—and their impact on privacy—will become even more important 
in the future. 
 
2. In-Person Campus Surveillance 
 
As schools attempt to reopen in full or in part, a number have proposed in-
person testing requirements, such as temperature scanning, COVID-19 virus 
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testing, or possibly immunity passports or other verification.287 The purported 
goals are to help recreate the benefits of having physical school spaces, including 
reducing the disparate impact on marginalized students who are harmed more 
by the shutting down of schools.  
 
However, increased testing and data collection on campus can have a 
harmful impact on privacy rights for students and staff in educational 
institutions. First, any new collection of data will create risks of data exposure, 
including to hackers and bad actors. Second, testing on campus would come 
with the same issues related to COVID-19 testing in general, as would immunity 
passports or other forms of COVID-related medical verification used on 
campus.  
 
What would differentiate these privacy-invasive measures from other forms 
of surveillance and data collection would be the educational context and the 
educational institution as the primary data controller and possibly the primary 
physical point of data collection. This narrows the field for regulation slightly, 
as some of the privacy harms can be stemmed solely by regulating educational 
instructions and educational privacy rights. Here, laws like FERPA and HIPAA 
may apply in only limited manners. 
 
Increasing surveillance in-person on campus could lead to a loss in students’ 
expectations of privacy. Students may feel like they have less privacy on campus, 
due to an increased surveillance apparatus present throughout the campus 
experience. This could lead to a loss in perceived educational privacy 
protections, making students less willing or able to pursue their intellectual 
interests and develop their knowledge and skills. 
 
3. Digital Inequities 
 
Distance learning has a potentially discriminatory impact on some groups. 
The shift to online learning exposes in even starker terms the digital divide, 
highlighting those who live in “digital poverty,” with less or no access to the 
internet or computing devices.288 An estimated 17% of students nationwide lack 
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access to a computer at home, and an additional 18% lack access to broadband 
internet at home.289 Before the pandemic, many of these students could have 
taken classes in person and relied on libraries, cafes, and other spaces for access 
to the internet and/or computers. During the pandemic, these options 
evaporated, worsening the already problematic digital divide.290 
 
This shift to remote education has also caused unequal privacy harms that 
have impacted groups in disparate ways. Privacy-invasive education surveillance 
systems often require access to devices and the internet, which can further 
exacerbate digital inequalities. Students who lack stable internet access have not 
been able to participate in school and related education activities now moved 
online. Similar problems have faced students who do not have access to their 
own computer or mobile device, some of whom must share limited remote-
computing equipment with multiple family members. Privacy-invasive software 
that scans activities and files on devices will thus harm the privacy both of the 
student as well as anyone else using the device, creating disparate privacy harms 
for low-income families who share devices.  
 
Just as the shift to remote online work has changed the boundaries between 
work and home, affecting the way society understands these two separate 
contexts and the corresponding expectations of privacy in each,291 so has the 
shift to remote education changed the boundaries between school and home. 
Students have certain expectations of privacy in the education setting. At the 
very least, there is an expectation, especially among older K-12 students and 
higher-education students, that schools offer spaces for private exploration of 
ideas and identities292 and learning without undue interference from family. For 
college students, this often meant an entirely separate physical surrounding, for 
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the many who lived in school dorms or on their own in college towns.  
 
Even for those living at home, schools provided spaces where students 
could expect to listen to lectures with a certain sense of privacy from some 
parties (namely, family). On the verso, students previously had an expectation 
of privacy regarding the separation of their home from their schools. They could 
reasonably expect that they would be able to protect information about their 
homes from the eyes of their fellow students or educators. Students who may 
have been able to pursue study of subjects independent of family consideration 
now lose the privacy of having separate educational spaces. (Consider the 
closeted gay teen studying LGBT history in defiance of religious conservative 
parents, who now must do all research from home, on shared devices.) 
 
With the shift to online learning, students are unable to protect the divide 
between their home and school spaces. Students in families facing more 
financial stress in this time are also at a disadvantage. Older students may be 
pressed to take on more work hours to make up for lost wages from other family 
members. Younger students may lack the parental supervision necessary for 
setting up and engaging in remote education. (For example, someone has to 
make sure to turn on the computer and connect to the online video session at 
the right times every day.) All of these personal financial circumstances may now 
be made public, or at least become visible to fellow students and educators, as 
the privacy-invasive nature of education technologies would expose situational 
factors like whether a parent was consistently able to help a younger student 
during class. 
 
The increased use of remote communication technologies in education also 
creates disadvantages for some students, based on income and socio-economic 
status.293 Consider the student living in a multigenerational household with 
parents, grandparents, and multiple siblings all in one small apartment, where it 
may be difficult to find any space quiet and isolated enough to participate fully 
in online classes or to do online study, even during the times the student is able 
to wrangle the family’s single computer for use. This student might not have 
steady Wi-Fi access or may be defaulting to a limited mobile data plan for 
accessing the internet. This student would be at a profound disadvantaged 
compared to a classmate who had access to better technology and home 
support.  
 
The pandemic has changed our society’s understanding of schools and 
homes as spaces,294 and has blurred the divide between school and home, 
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resulting in new understandings of what should be a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in either context.295 Students learning online through video 
communications technologies must now allow their fellow students and teachers 
into the privacy of their homes, including (for some) whatever objects are in 
viewing distance of their computers. Students who live in physical settings 
without the space and quiet necessary for learning via distance education have 
been placed at a disadvantage. Some students may feel a sense of shame about 
showing photos or videos of their home environments to other students. 
Consider the lower-income scholarship student at a private school who must 
now virtually invite their wealthier peers to view their home. However, 
technology can also be used to help ameliorate some of these harms. For 
example, students have taken to using Zoom virtual backgrounds to keep their 
homes from public view even while on video chat.296 
 
Many students will suffer disparate harms in this time of pandemic. Not only 
will lower income students face financial stresses with less ability to fight against 
privacy invasions,297 but students who are themselves parents will face greater 
burdens as they attempt to navigate their studies (and sometimes work) at the 
same time as handling childcare. Even in households where both parents work 
from home, women have still been doing more childcare and more household 
work during the pandemic era.298 This means a disproportionate harm to women 
students,299 as they will have less time to keep up with schoolwork compared to 
their male peers. This sharp inequality will also be reflected in more burdens on 
women who must parent children as they navigate new education technologies 
when schools are shut down.300 Women may be found to be less productive301 
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than their peers as both students and workers who happen to be parents of 
students. Women likely will bear the bulk of the burden in supporting their 
children in transitioning to remote learning technologies, and will likely then 
suffer unique and disproportionate privacy harms302 related to the use of such 
technologies.303 
 
Students, parents, and educators may all face disparate harms due to 
coronavirus epidemic as well as the push to online learning aided by new 
technologies. These harms may fall upon those who belong to low-income, 
rural, undocumented, disabled, or other groups. An additional harm may simply 
be that students will be pressed to disclose their conditions to educators, fellow 
students, and administrators during this time. For example, students with some 
“hidden” disabilities may be forced to ask for accommodations, if their 
disabilities make remote distance learning difficult.304 This disclosure can lead to 
a loss of privacy and a sense of lack of control over one’s own personal health 
information, financial information, or more. 
 
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Education Privacy 
 
a. Existing Protections Are Not Enough 
 
The educational privacy interests of students are particularly important to 
safeguard in a public-health emergency. As Elana Zeide writes, students may 
themselves be an especially vulnerable population when it comes to privacy.305 
Many students are children, a class the law has consistently recognized as 
deserving of particular protections, including within U.S. privacy 
jurisprudence.306 Students often have little choice regarding the educational-
privacy practices of their schools.307 As Zeide notes, FERPA and similar state 
laws “were designed for a world of paper records, not networked, cloud-based 
platforms that collect information automatically”308—i.e., the very platforms 
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being utilized at great scale by educational institutions during this shift to online 
learning.  
 
Only public educational institutions, or institutions that receive public 
funding, are subject to FERPA.309 FERPA imposes certain obligations on public 
educational institutions, as well as (by proxy) institutions that receive data from 
them. FERPA imposes restrictions on access and transfer of student data and 
allows students and parents certain rights regarding student data. However, 
FERPA is limited to only applying to public institutions, and many schools are 
private. During the pandemic, most schools, public and private, transitioned to 
online learning. Many schools, public or private, have also relied on private 
education-technology companies. While the data collected and transmitted by 
the public institution would be protected under FERPA, public institutions may 
still be encouraging use of private companies’ technologies, which would not 
necessarily be covered, depending on how data is collected from students. Zeide 
notes that the institutional reliance on FERPA creates undue burden for 
students, parents, and educators, and fails to protect the privacy of students.310 
 
Second, FERPA only applies to certain educational student records and not 
all student data collected in the course of educational experience. For example, 
while student grades would be considered data covered under FERPA, photos 
of students taken during exam monitoring would not. Third, FERPA allows for 
a variety of permitted disclosures of student records, including to other 
organizations acting on behalf of the school for legitimate purposes. With more 
parties having access to student data, it is more difficult to safeguard the privacy 
of students. Additionally, new forms of data are being generated that may or 
may not be considered protectable under FERPA. (Consider, for example, 
screenshots of Zoom sessions that include small profile photos or live camera 
of students. While school photographs can be protectable under FERPA, this 
new class of content or data may not be.) FERPA is rather limited in scope and 
does rather little to protect students or their parents and guardians from the 
privacy impacts of the pandemic-fueled shifts in use of technology.311  
 
Many education technology companies will have to comply with privacy 
laws and general consumer-protection laws. FTC authority would extend to 
companies and services like Zoom, WebEx, Google Classrooms, and exam-
monitoring companies. For these education companies and platforms, the FTC 
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could still enforce similar privacy protections as it would in other sectors. 
Education technology companies thus have to adhere to similar standards as all 
companies regarding privacy, including posting privacy notices and 
(importantly) not violating any of the terms that they set out in their privacy 
notices or terms of service. If a company were found to have not upheld the 
representations they made out to consumers in their terms, the FTC would have 
authority to enforce judgments against them.  
 
Additionally, for education settings involving children, additional federal 
and state legal protections would apply for children’s privacy. The Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) protects the privacy of children under 
thirteen. Under COPPA, companies must adhere to a set of standards, including 
posting visible privacy policies and obtaining verifiable parental consent before 
collecting the data of children under thirteen. Parents and guardians of children 
under thirteen also have special rights under COPPA, including a right to revoke 
consent at any time and request that a company delete their child’s data. Some 
states also have special protections for children’s privacy. For example, 
California’s “eraser law” allows children under eighteen to request companies 
delete their data, among other rights.312 
 
However, even with existing protections, privacy laws in the United States 
are insufficient to protect privacy, for consumers as students and as individuals. 
Private-sector privacy laws do not sufficiently protect against the harms of Big 
Data and the downstream harms of data that may be abused or used against a 
person after sale, transfer, aggregation, reidentification, or more.313 U.S. privacy 
law must safeguard civil liberties against the threat of data brokers and the data 
economy. Individuals need a way to legally seek recourse for distributed 
downstream data harms, including harms compounded by biased or faulty 
algorithmic systems.314 One way to do this is to create better laws addressing 
algorithmic harms, allowing individuals to seek redress for incorrectly made 
algorithmic decisions that impact fundamental rights, for example.   
 
b. A Right to Educational Privacy 
 
Current laws dealing with education and privacy protect privacy rights based 
on types of data subjects: students, consumers, and so on. However, these laws 
do not protect the right of an individual to have the environmental privacy 
necessary for pursuing a path of education. The laws do not protect the privacy 
provided by the physical presence of a school or education institution, or the 
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privacy provided by an educational platform that allows for individualized 
learning. Education privacy laws generally also do not protect the educational 
privacy rights of educators or researchers, who also benefit from the privacy of 
physical education spaces. 
 
The use of education technologies in times of pandemic have exposed the 
need for an updated right to educational privacy. The increased use of new 
education technologies, the public-private hybrid nature of many education 
technology platforms, and the unique vulnerabilities of the student population 
give rise to the need for a new right to educational privacy, a right the law should 
protect in addition to protections for children and existing protections for 
student privacy in public institutions. Some, including Khalilah Barnes, have 
even called for the creation of a Students’ Bill of Rights,315 protecting key rights 
like privacy. 
 
The heightened sensitivities of the pandemic era expose a number of gaps 
in the legal protections for students. First, there should be more legal limitations 
on private educational institutions collecting, using, and sharing student data. 
FERPA protections do not apply to most collection of student data done by 
private platforms. In addition to relevant privacy obligations under COPPA and 
general privacy laws, educational institutions (public or private) should be held 
to a higher standard. The law should recognize the school or the educational 
institution as a specific place and context, with specific privacy expectations that 
are different from other business contexts.  
 
Additionally, the increased use of educational technologies has exposed the 
necessity of addressing the disparate harms suffered by people from various 
marginalized communities as a result of reliance on new technologies. New 
privacy laws should take care to address the special needs of different students, 
e.g., protecting against online harassment, which disproportionately affects 
some groups. Students from marginalized populations may have special needs 
when it comes to educational privacy, including the need to have private space—
digital or offline—when private space is at a premium at home.  
 
Laws narrowly tailored to address the space necessary for educational 
privacy should allow for innovation across education sectors, including private-
sector educational platforms. The law should recognize the educational-privacy 
interests that students have in protecting the privacy of their educational paths 
and learning processes, to aid in independent exploration of ideas and personal 
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and educational development.316 Protecting educational privacy as a distinct 
right would acknowledge that students of all ages, in public and private 
institutions, have a privacy interest linked specifically to the concept of 
education as requiring intellectual freedom. 
 
Furthermore, educational privacy should encompass privacy protection for 
educators and researchers as well, as all are part of the larger knowledge 
production system. To protect the institution of formalized education, we 
should honor and protect the privacy necessary for students, educators, and 
researchers to teach, learn, generate, and share knowledge. 
 
D.  Consumer-Connection Technologies 
 
Remote-communication technologies have been used to a great extent in 
employment and education settings in response to the changes in society caused 
by the pandemic. However, technologies like Zoom, Google Hangouts, and 
other remote-communication technologies have also been used to increased 
effect by ordinary human beings outside of their roles as employees or 
students.317 All of these technologies come with privacy and security issues.318 It 
is important to discuss the impact the pandemic has had on society’s relationship 
with privacy and technology, on an individual, human level.  
 
1. Remote-Connection Technologies 
 
As the pandemic has enforced social distancing conditions, humans have 
turned to technologies to stay in touch and maintain social relationships. This 
has included use of mobile phones and connected devices to communicate, 
whether through text messaging, phone calls,319 video calls, and more. In early 
April, Verizon reported an average of 800 million wireless calls a day during the 
week, more than double the number of calls usually made on Mother’s Day 
(often one of the busiest days of the year for phone calls).320 In the same time 
 
316 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Neil M. Richards, 
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008). 
317 Taylor Lorenz et al., We Live in Zoom Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/style/zoom-parties-coronavirus-memes.html. 
318 Allen St. John, It’s Not Just Zoom. Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, and Webex Have Privacy 
Issues, Too., YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/not-just-
zoom-google-meet-180813488.html. 
319 Cecilia Kang, The Humble Phone Call Has Made a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/technology/phone-calls-voice-virus.html; Return of the 
Phone Call: Why Talking Beats Texting When You’re in Isolation, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2020, 11:05 
AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2020/mar/17/return-of-the-phone-
call-why-talking-beats-texting-when-youre-in-isolation. 
320 Cecilia Kang, The Humble Phone Call Has Made a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/technology/phone-calls-voice-virus.html. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690004
 PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC 78 
period, internet traffic rose to twenty to twenty-five percent more than typical 
for the time.321 
 
Increased use of phones, home internet connections, mobile devices, and 
Voice Over IP programs means an increase in risk exposure for consumers in 
regards to the privacy risks associated with these technologies. For example, the 
privacy risks associated with phone calls include potential for wiretapping as well 
as upstream surveillance from telecom providers as well as governments, who 
have many avenues of access to phone data.  
 
The pandemic has also caused a shift in interpersonal privacy, the privacy 
that exists within social relationships. Social distancing has meant that more 
socialization has shifted to the online space, including gatherings of friends and 
family. Additionally, remote technologies have been used for dating and 
romantic relationships. In a time when many people have been encouraged to 
stay at home, and to maintain physical distance from others when outside the 
home, many have turned to online chat, SMS, voice, and video chat to engage 
in romantic activities.322 The simple fact that more people are using these 
technologies for these purposes creates greater risk for abuse—including legally 
unprotected forms of sexual harassment,323 stalking, nonconsensual 
pornography,324 sexual deep fakes,325 and more. It is also possible that individuals 
less versed in the dangers of online platforms in romantic contexts may now be 
using those platforms, leading to greater potential for harm.  
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Danielle Citron has theorized a right to sexual privacy, the privacy 
concerning not only sexual information and sexual activities, but also the privacy 
necessary to create room for human intimacy and intimate relationships.326 It is 
important to understand sexual privacy in light of remote technologies, 
particularly in the midst of a pandemic that discourages in-person contact. Many 
of these technologies lack legal protections for privacy aside from the minimal 
U.S. sector-specific privacy protections. As Citron argues, current privacy laws 
do not adequately protect sexual-privacy interests. Citron calls for legal reform 
to protect sexual privacy, including potentially the creation of new legislation 
dedicated specifically to sexual-privacy rights.327 The need for sexual-privacy 
protections is even more clear, as the pandemic has accelerated the adoption of 
new technologies in romantic contexts.  
 
2. In-Person Consumer Surveillance 
 
Corporations have also begun surveilling their consumers in physical spaces, 
in an effort to limit virus transmission. For example, some movie theaters have 
proposed privacy-invasive measures, including temperature scans and symptom 
questionnaires at the door.328 In early May 2020, Disneyland Shanghai 
announced that it would reopen with enforced social distancing,329 and Disney 
CEO Bob Iger has said the company has considered implementing temperature 
checks at the door.330 It is possible companies could use technologies, including 
drone surveillance cameras, facial recognition, Bluetooth beacons, and more to 
enforce measures such as social distancing, mask wearing, and contact tracing. 
 
Thus, individuals may find themselves the subjects of both government 
surveillance and corporate surveillance. While individuals have some recourse 
against government intrusions on fundamental rights, it is not so much the case 
with corporate surveillance. Thus, attention must be paid to corporations’ use 
of consumer surveillance as response to the COVID-19 epidemic, as it is likely 
these surveillance measures will not immediately disappear once the pandemic 
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has ended. 
 
3. Digital Inequities 
 
Children and young people may have unique experiences with privacy and 
technology in this public-health crisis. As schools have moved online and other 
activities have shut down, minor students have likely been using computers and 
mobile devices in an unsupervised capacity at higher rates than before. Children 
and young adults have been creative in their use of Zoom outside of educational 
uses—using Zoom for dating, parties, and other social engagements.331 Children 
could be losing the safety that comes with having adult supervision by parents 
or teachers in some of their use of these technologies.332 This raises greater 
potential for abuse, including privacy harms like harassment, cyberstalking, 
cyberbullying,333 child targeting, nonconsensual pornography,334 and other 
privacy violations, including sexual-privacy violations.335  
 
Privacy harms related to communication via online or remote platforms are 
often worse for women and girls,336 LGBTQ people,337 people of minority status 
(based on race, religion, or other), disabled people, and other individuals who 
come from marginalized groups.338 Algorithmic harms are often worse for many 
marginalized groups, as the effects of AI bias reflect the systemic biases in 
society. The increased use of technology, including privacy-invasive technology 
and AI-based systems, will likely have an unequal impact on privacy for different 
groups. 
 
The lack of free, accessible remote communication technologies has not 
only disparately harmed the poor and people in rural communities, but it also 
 
331 Taylor Lorenz et al., We Live in Zoom Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/style/zoom-parties-coronavirus-memes.html. 
332 Press Release, Cox Commc’ns, New Research Reveals Risky Internet Behavior Among 
Teens, but There Are Encouraging Signs of Improvement with Increased Involvement of 
Parents and Guardians COX COMMC’NS (May 10, 2007), 
http://www.cox.com/wcm/en/aboutus/datasheet/takecharge/archives/2007-risky-
behavior.pdf. 
333 Ari Ezra Waldman, Triggering Tinker: Student Speech in the Age of Cyberharassment, 71 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 427 (2017). 
334 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, Criminalizing 
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and 
Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 987 (2019). 
335 Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.LawJ. 1870 (2019). 
336 Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2000); ANITA L. 
ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988) 
337 Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: “Revenge Porn” in Gay Online 
Communities, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 987 (2019). 
338 Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051 (2018). 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690004
 PRIVACY IN PANDEMIC 81 
disproportionally harms incarcerated people and their loved ones. Incarcerated 
people already have few of the communication abilities people in the free world 
enjoy. As prisons have locked down visits, some facilities have also limited the 
ability for incarcerated people to access phones and computers (or in some 
cases, any shared spaces).339 As remote videoconferencing technology explodes 
in usage elsewhere, the same cannot be said for jails and prisons. Incarcerated 
people already have few expectations of privacy, but here, better 
videoconferencing technologies could help restore human dignity to 
incarcerated people and their loved ones in the free world. 
 
4. Legal and Regulatory Interventions to Protect Consumer Privacy 
 
The law offers legal protections for communications privacy, including the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The increased use of landlines and 
mobile telephone calls highlights the need for privacy protections over 
telephone communications, in addition to the protections needed for online 
communications. 
 
However, the use of remote technologies highlights problems related to 
technology platforms, including those used for communication in a time of 
social distancing. One area of interest is intermediary liability, or the immunity 
protections certain internet platforms receive regarding some areas of liability. 
The increased use of remote working technologies that include photo, audio, or 
video also create greater content moderation, speech regulation, and online 
harassment concerns for tech platforms. In particular, the increasing importance 
of technology platforms in this public health crisis raise issues of platform 
governance, including issues of online harassment, speech, and liability (or 
immunity from liability), aiding the greater trend of tech platforms becoming 
what Kate Klonick has named “the new governors of speech.”340  
 
In the United States, many internet intermediaries are protected by Section 
230, a law that provides immunity for certain platforms against some types of 
claims based on user-generated content on the platform.341 Section 230 has been 
the subject of much debate among scholars, policymakers, and courts. Some 
argue that Section 230 is “the law that created the Internet,”342 while others argue 
 
339 Joseph Shapiro, As COVID-19 Spreads imn Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear Of More 
Solitary Confinement, NPR (June 15, 2020 4:53 PM ET), 
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that the law allows for critical harms to privacy and civil liberties.343 Congress 
amended Section 230 in 2018 with the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online 
Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA),344 leaving an opening for further erosion 
of Section 230 protection for platforms. While it remains to be seen how Section 
230 protections will fare in the future, the myriad problems with technology 
platform power have become a pain point for many policymakers, particularly 
as momentum has built against the technology industry (referred to some as the 
“techlash345”). 
 
To regulate technology platforms, a privacy-forward approach must balance 
two competing privacy interests: the interests of individuals to protect their data 
from others; and the interests of individuals in being able to access a space that 
allows them the privacy to develop their own identities and pursue their 




A.  Changing Privacy Norms 
 
Our expectations of privacy (reasonable or not) are changing. The overall 
rise of the digital economy is certainly part of this change, but the integral roles 
of technology in this pandemic have also served to accelerate change in privacy 
norms. While it may be tempting to say that some of these changes will be 
limited to the time of pandemic, it is likely that changes in norms will have longer 
effects over time.  
 
1. Blurring the Line Between Cyber and Physical Space 
 
The pandemic pushed life indoors and online. As work, school, and social 
life all moved online, society has seen a further erosion in the division between 
the digital and the physical. Some of the privacy losses suffered in this pandemic 
have related to the loss of physical spaces. Students have lost the educational 
privacy afforded to them by the physical space of schools and universities. 
Employees have lost the privacy of their home, as remote employee surveillance 
 
343 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying 
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has blurred the boundaries of space. The pandemic has also caused a crisis in 
interpersonal privacy, the privacy that exists within social relationships, as more 
relationships either play out in a remote, connected fashion, or are disrupted by 
the growing use of remote technologies in the home.  
 
As society becomes increasingly digitized, with many essential functions of 
society taking place in the digital realm or through digital intermediaries, the 
distinction between digital and physical becomes increasingly meaningless. We 
are living through contextual shifts in how society understands the borders and 
limits of physical and digital spaces. Privacy law should attempt to protect cyber 
space as much as it protects physical space and digital privacy as much as it does 
physical privacy. This shift in norms has been slowly developing over time, and 
the pandemic’s focus on remote socialization may have highlighted or quickened 
this change. 
 
2. Privacy Is Essential for Public Health 
 
Both public and private actors have used the public health emergency as a 
rationale for deployment of privacy-invasive technologies and technologically-
influenced programs. Individuals have been asked to accept more and more 
privacy-violating technologies, in a number of spaces. At the same time, both 
physical and digital privacy have been threatened, all for the sake of pandemic 
response. However, there will always be another emergency. This is particularly 
apparent, as many of the technologies used in pandemic response are not 
entirely new technologies. What has changed is the shift in scale and the shift in 
justification for violations of privacy. 
 
Society must protect the health of its people. We must remain vigilant about 
privacy incursions, because shifts in privacy norms now will lead to lasting 
repercussions even after the emergency has ended. We must also design these 
systems with purpose limitation for collection, use, and transfer of data, so that 
a system that collects data for public health will not later be used to infringe 
upon individual rights. Furthermore, for every technology and technologically-
influenced response to this pandemic, there has always been a maximally secure 
and privacy-protecting version. Both state and private actors should consult with 
technologists and advocates in creating and implementing programs for public 
health response. Laws must be nimble enough to allow for flexibility, but with 
exceptions narrowly tailored to prevent privacy overreach due to purpose 
dilution. 
 
Not only can privacy and public health co-exist, but privacy is essential for 
public health. As seen with the failure in digital contact app adoption, individuals 
will not willingly give their data to governments or companies if they cannot 
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trust that their privacy rights will be respected. This is problematic because 
pandemics and public health crises of all sorts require new technological 
innovations and technologically influenced solutions. To protect public health, 
we must protect privacy. 
 
B.  Law and Policy Recommendations 
 
At time of writing, Congress is evaluating two competing bills dedicated to 
privacy and COVID-19.346 Both bills address privacy protections for the data 
collection and tracking measures used in public health response. There does not 
appear to be enough political momentum to bring either bill to fruition, in an 
election year.347 However, there is still time to use lessons from this pandemic 
to solve privacy issues for the future. 
 
1. Sectoral Privacy Protection Is Not Enough 
 
The pandemic’s privacy impacts reach across areas of law, from consumer 
protection regulation to government surveillance law, and across different 
industries, from education to healthcare. It is difficult to grasp the full landscape 
of privacy in pandemic, due to the ever-expanding web of laws and regulations 
that touch upon privacy and technology. That difficulty, highlighted by the 
pressing urgency of the pandemic, is in itself one of the lessons to be gleaned 
from analyzing privacy and technology in this public health crisis. Regulating by 
data type and data setting does not work without overarching principles and 
cohesiveness between legal protections. 
 
While limiting federal privacy regulation to specific laws for specific sectors 
may have been adequate for the early days of the internet and connected 
technologies, it is past time for Congress to pass a national privacy law that 
would provide cohesive, coherent rules based on core privacy values, that could 
then be translated to different sectors, industries, types of data, and types of data 
actors. The difficulty of protecting privacy in coronavirus testing is only one 
example of when the various sector-specific privacy laws fail to protect privacy 
or associate harms for individuals. The rising use of remote communication 
technologies in education is another such example, as even the strongest 
amalgamation of FERPA, COPPA, and FTC consumer protection law would 
not be enough to protect student or educational privacy. The sectoral privacy 
regime creates confusion, and the difficulty of compliance with conflicting 
 
346 COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020); 
Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3759, 116th Cong. (2020). 
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requirements may hamper innovation and public health response. Differing 
state regulations compound that confusion, with some state laws becoming de 
facto regulations for the nation based on difficulty of compliance.348  
 
A federal privacy law will be most useful in creating privacy values and 
standards across sectors, while still allowing for sectoral privacy laws to fill in 
the gaps. Technologies are constantly changing, as are uses of technologies, as 
we have seen with medical AI, telehealth communication technologies, and 
healthcare robots. Thus, it is more useful to create laws that allow for room for 
innovation and growth of industries, as opposed to laws that are overly 
restrictive, particularly in an omnibus regulation that seeks to govern many 
industries. For example, instead of regulating particular technologies, like 
healthcare robots, a federal privacy law could instead specifically regulate 
collection and use of data, as well as physical privacy violations caused by 
technologies with physical presence or embodiment.  
 
2. Health, Biometric, and Genetic Privacy Laws Are Insufficient 
 
The pandemic has highlighted the inadequacies of current laws in protecting 
sensitive health information, including biometric information, genetic 
information, and more. This is apparent if for no other reason than that the 
public health response to this global pandemic has generated the collection and 
processing of a vast quantity of data that could be considered health, biometric, 
or genetic data.  
 
Any federal privacy law that seeks to govern all sectors must include 
protections for health information and other sensitive categories of information. 
A federal privacy law could serve to fill in some of the gaps of HIPAA, GINA, 
and other laws that govern health information. For example, a federal privacy 
law could protect patients when their data is collected by an actor that is not a 
HIPAA-covered entity or business associate (something that has occurred with 
some of the COVID-19 testing and contact tracing). It would also be wise to 
include some of the provisions from state health privacy laws, including 
biometric information privacy laws. 
 
In lieu of a comprehensive federal privacy law, the U.S. needs stronger 
sectoral privacy laws that would govern health, biometric, and genetic privacy. 
Until a federal privacy law comes to pass, attention should be paid to updating 
existing laws to address the potential for violations of health privacy and genetic 
privacy. We should expand GINA to include greater protections against genetic 
 
348 For example, in managing compliance, organizations may set their standards to match 
the strictest state laws, making those state laws the de facto laws of the nation. Additionally, 
when creating new laws, policymakers often borrow from other states’ laws. 
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discrimination, including protection against disparate harms as Ifeoma Ajunwa 
has suggested, as well as protection against discrimination based on 
characteristics or health information that might not be categorized as genetic 
data. Additionally, we should expand GINA protections past the currently 
limited sectors of employment and health insurance discrimination to include 
fundamental rights such as education and housing. Furthermore, genetic privacy 
rights, including rights to donate data without fear of law enforcement access, 
should be expanded, either through a genetic privacy law or through provisions 
in a larger health or biometric privacy law.  
 
Our current health privacy regime is insufficient to protect the privacy of 
what is perhaps the most sensitive data for any individual: biometric data, or 
data relating to or emanating from the body. Biometric data is particularly 
important to protect because such data is not only extremely identifiable but 
also intrinsically linked to our sense of selves. There’s a fundamental difference 
between a data breach of credit card numbers versus a breach of face photos. 
We understand that difference intuitively, and individuals deserve stronger 
privacy protections for their sensitive biometric information, including health 
information and genetic information. 
 
3. Privacy Law Must Address Digital Inequities  
 
The pandemic has thrown into sharp relief the digital and economic 
inequities of modern life. No privacy law will ever fully protect the privacy of 
the people unless it takes into account inequities in privacy and technology. We 
should address discrimination as an information privacy harm, particularly 
related to algorithmic discrimination, which is based on information related to 
individuals. A federal privacy law should include protections for particularly 
vulnerable classes, as well as limitations on discriminatory uses of data (including 
disparate impact). These protections should be explicitly built into federal 
privacy law. 
 
In lieu of a strong omnibus privacy law that includes protection against 
discrimination and disparate harm, other legal changes can help serve similar 
purpose. Laws that protect against harms that are often gendered or racialized 
can be helpful, including specific laws targeting harms like online harassment, 
cyberstalking, nonconsensual pornography, and swatting.349 Additionally, laws 
that give more rights to data subjects, including algorithmic rights can help 
empower individuals who may suffer disproportionately from the harms of 
surveillance and algorithmic decision-making systems. One example is enforcing 
transparency and accountability for algorithms used in sentencing. 
 
349 For example, New York’s  non-consensual pornography law and a similar bill still 
stalled in Congress. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/nyregion/revenge-porn-law.html 
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4. Privacy Law Should Protect a Right to Educational Privacy 
 
By shifting education to the digital space, and to the private home, the 
pandemic has exposed flaws in privacy protections for students and educators. 
Privacy law protects children as vulnerable classes under COPPA and FERPA. 
However, these protections are limited in types of data (student records for 
FERPA) and categories of data subjects and data controllers. We should reform 
education privacy laws to include protections ordinarily afforded to the physical 
educational space. Protection of educational privacy should transcend 
protection of children as a vulnerable class or school records as a sensitive form 
of data and should include instructors, researchers, and others engaged in the 
intellectual enterprise of education. Educational privacy protections should also 
be applicable to both public and private entities. This is but one failure in the 
current sectoral privacy regime, and one example of how the shifting privacy 
norms of cyber and physical space should change the way privacy law regulates. 
 
5. Privacy-Forward Platform Regulation 
 
The question of how to regulate technology platforms has risen to the 
forefront in recent years, and both policymakers and the general public have 
pressed for reform in a number of ways. The pandemic has exposed once again 
the integral role of technology companies and intermediaries in society, as 
technologies like remote videoconferencing apps and digital contact tracing apps 
have become important in COVID-19 response.  
 
There are of course more problems with platform regulation than privacy. 
Internet intermediaries provide venues for speech to occur, and potential issues 
that must be raised for platform regulation include online speech access and 
expression, online harassment, election interference, disinformation, and more. 
Additionally, perhaps the greatest challenge in platform regulation today is not 
privacy or online speech but rather the power imbalance between increasingly 
powerful technology companies and people and governments. Some of this 
power imbalance is due to the vast quantity of data many of the large technology 
companies are able to collect, which has privacy implications but is not 
necessarily a privacy-exclusive issue. 
 
Platform regulation must protect the privacy of individual consumers, as 
many have advocated for in calls to reform. However, the pandemic has also 
highlighted the gradual social shift of society in increasingly considering digital 
spaces as substitutions or supplements to physical spaces. Thus, it is crucial that 
intermediary regulation not overly restrict intermediaries such that they would 
no longer be able to provide the privacy of digital spaces that are necessary for 
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identity development, intellectual exploration, freedom of speech, and more. We 
must support privacy-forward platform regulation, separating the regulation of 
technology companies as economic actors and the regulation of intermediaries 
as venues for speech and connection.  
 
6. Regulating Data Aggregators and Downstream Data Harms 
 
The complex data cycles related to COVID-19 testing and contact tracing 
show the difficulty of regulating based on initial point of collection. Laws do not 
sufficiently protect against downstream harms, partly because it is difficult on a 
technical basis for anyone party involved in a data lifecycle to track all the 
different places data may go and different parties who may have access to said 
data.  
 
It is time for regulation that addresses the compounded privacy harms of 
data aggregation. Currently, there are only a few state laws that address data 
brokers or data aggregators. A federal law that regulates data aggregators as an 
industry has the potential of protecting against myriad hams. Regulations that 
target data aggregators can include, but should not be limited to enforcing 
transparency about data sources that aggregators purchase and collect, as well as 
rights for individual data subjects to request access to data collected about them, 
as well as rights to correct and delete said data, and rights to opt out entirely 
from having their data be included as part of data sets used and sold by data 
aggregators. U.S. law includes some of these rights for some types of data 
aggregation, including laws allowing individuals to opt out of marketing mail, 
for example, as well as laws for algorithmic transparency in financial credit 
reporting.350 
 
Many of the downstream data harms relate to the potential of data being 
misused as part of machine learning and algorithmic decision-making. U.S. law 
does not generally address rights related to algorithmic decision-making (with 
some exceptions), but the law should regulate situations where algorithmic 





This Article takes the particularities of the pandemic as a lens through which 
to gauge the progress of privacy protections across sectors, using the COVID-
19 pandemic as a historical reference point. What is interesting about technology 
is not its novelty, but its salience. Similarly, what is interesting about studying 
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privacy in pandemic is not the novelty of the pandemic itself or the use of 
technology during these times, but rather what emerge as salient reflections on 
privacy, technology, and public health in society today.  
 
The global COVID-19 pandemic has changed society in myriad ways, and 
it will take the long lens of history to understand the ramifications of this societal 
crisis. What is certain is that developments during this time, whether or not they 
relate to privacy and technology, will influence future directions for society. The 
data-driven programs developed as COVID-19 response, from viral testing to 
consumer communication technologies, have already transformed the way 
society interacts with technology and concepts of privacy. Our privacy norms 
are changing, and it is all but inevitable that the pandemic’s effects will be long-
lasting, with unforetold implications for our future society and its relationship 
with technology. As we progress toward that future, it is imperative that we 
create conceptions of privacy that are beneficial for society, as well as laws and 
regulations that protect both public health and civil liberties.  
 
This Article provides a contemporary account of privacy, technology, and 
public health at this critical point in time. These situations will change as the 
pandemic progresses, comes to an end, and eventually, diminishes from the 
public sphere and public memory. As Teju Cole writes, in an essay on the 
difficulty of analyzing an in-progress pandemic, “History’s first draft is almost 
always wrong—but we still have to try and write it.”351 
 





351 Teju Cole, We Can’t Comprehend This Much Sorrow, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/18/magazine/covid-quarantine-sorrow.html. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690004
